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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHJ\IIOND. 
Record No. 1546 
"METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE C01V£P ANY 
versus 
vVLADYSLA VE Iffi-UPEL. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the J~tstices of the·Supt·erne Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, the Metropolitan Life Insurance· Company, 
respectfully represents to this Honorable Court that it is 
ag·grieved by a judgment of the Corporation Court for the 
City of Lynchburg, 'Tirginia, entered on the 5th day of March, 
1934, for the sum of $397.25, recovered against it in a cer-
tain action at law therein pending, 'vherein Wladyslav.e 
Krupel was plaintiff and your petitioner 'vas defendant. 
A duly authenticated transcript of the record is hereto 
attached and made a part of this petition. 
srrATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
The major question here presented is whether a laborer, 
claiming total and permanent disability, prior to April 1, 
1932, the date when his insurance wa.s cancelled, who works 
at regular employment, as a laborer, from June 27, 1932, 
to October 12, 1932, can recover for such disability, without 
shewing tl1at the later work, admittedly done, was trivial 
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and inconsequential or so detrimental to his physical welfare 
as to evidence his necessitv and not his ability to perforru 
work for compensation. "' 
The ju~ment cDmplained of r~present:S a reeovery of cer-
tain installments of insurance under a group policy of life 
insurance issued by petitioner sorne years ago to Lynchburg 
Foundry Company, whereby the employees of said company 
were insured in varying amounts payable in the event of 
death, with provision for the accelerated payment of bene-
fits in installments in the event of total and permanent dis-
ability, as defined in the policy, occurring while the insurance 
was in force. The plaintiff, as au employee of Lynchburg 
Foundry Company, became entitled to insurance in the amount 
of $2,000.00, under a policy which provided that, in lieu of 
death benefits, this sum would be paid in monthly installments 
upon due proof furnished the company 
''that any employee, while insured hereunder and prior to 
his sixtieth birthday, has become totally and permanently 
disabled, as a result of bodily injury or disease, so as to be 
prevented thereby from -engaging in any occupation and per-
forming any work for 'vage or profit". 
The present recovery represents the prorated amount of 
benefits due for the period between the filing of claim and 
the institution of the suit, if anything is due the plaintiff, 
under the circumstances set forth in the record. 
Upon the. trial of the case it was conceded that the plain-
tiff was insured iu rthe amount of $2,000.00, and that his em-
.ployment by the Foundry Company terminated as of Aprll 
1, 1932, ~upon which date he was laid off for slack work and 
the cancellation of his insurance became effective. 
This suit was :brought in October, 1933, more than a year 
fGllowing the termfuation of plaintiff's employment with the 
Fonncb:y Company, .and actually came to trial in January, 
.1934. 
The plaintiff had b.een ill the employ of J..~ynchburg Foundry 
Company for several years before the date of his release. 
'vorking as a '·'pipe grindei·", smoothing off iron castings 
with an en1ery wheel. According to the medical testimony 
in the :case, this :occupation entailed the inhalation of par-
ticles of dust, ·which eventually tended to produce a cona1-
.t.ion known :as silicosis, :with a resulting impairment of his 
lung ca,pacit.;y. It further appears in ·evidence that some 
time dur1ng the winter of 1930-1931 the plaintiff ·had pneu-
tm,onia and "~as absent from :work for sevei·al months (R., 
p. 30), following which he did not demonstrate the same 
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rt:apacity for wo1·k. The r.ecor.d further shows that during 
the last Jnonths of his employment by the Foundry C.ompa~y 
w-ork wa.s slack, dr.opping off tp as little as one day a week 
.(R., p. _26), .an.d .during this p.erio.d it was seldom that the 
Foundry would work .as many as three consecutive days. 
It .also .app.e.are.d (B., p. ·26) th~t, prior to his release and 
the c.aneellation .of his insurance, the plaintiff worked about 
four.-fif:ths .of the time that was actually available. 
The plaintiff was intr9duced as a witness in his own be-
half, with a pr.eliminary sta•teme;nt by his counsel that he 
.spoke English :ve;ry imp.erfectly Gtnd w:ould be .examined by an 
.interpreter, Mr. Grossman (R., p. 16). It eventuated that 
ithe interpreter did not know Polish, the plaintiff's native 
language, a.nd was ther.efore of but little assistance. With 
.some .difficulty his counsel.elicite4 from him the facts that he 
was the plaintiff in this case, worked for the Lynchburg 
Foundry Comp.any .as a pipe grinder until he wa_s cut off in 
l-'Iarch, 1932; that ~t the time of trial he was not able to 
.work.; that he was then unable to see and had trouble with 
-his lungs while w-o11·king for the Fo:undry'\ Company. The wit-
ness further admitted signi~g his disability claim (R., p. 21), 
.in which ihe .stated that he was first totally disabled by sick-
ness so a.s to be wholly unable to work, on October 11, 193~ 
mor1e than six months after his policy expired. 
'ir.he phy.sicians who attended .the plaintiff, trom time .to 
.tim~, weiie ealle.d -to .testify .as to hls condition. Dr. A. L. Wil-
son .attended l1im in the winter of 1930-1931 (R., p. 35 ), when 
.he !had pneumonia, and again in April of 1931, the spell last-
ing into May, following 'vhich attacks, the patient's lungs 
.dia no.t clear \l:P as one ·would naturally expect. This wit-
ness <iloes not semn to have .seen the patient from 1\iay 16, 
il931, until the time of trial (iR., p. 3'5), but he was called 
·.upon :to ,express this opinion .upon the plaintiff's total and 
;permanent disability a·bout A-pril 1, 1932, to which opinion 
tde:fe:ndant obrlected .(R., p. :36). His reply was that on ac-
.eount o£ his coJ1tinual hxonchitis and shortness of b-reath 
!he was unable to do manual ·:work. On cross examination the 
:witness sta.ted (R., .p. 40) that this prognosis on his pa1,t 
was subject to chang·e in vie'v of circumstances that demon-
strated the man·'s ability .to work. 
This 'vitness .was followed by Dr. Younger, who was called 
in consultation in April, 1931, 'vhen the plaintiff was suffering 
.from pneumonia (R., p. 41). This witness found the pulmon-
_ary condition, which he ascribed to the inhalation of dust, 
concluding that the plaintiff ·was permanently injured, and 
while he will be able to -work to some extent, when .the 
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elements are in his favor, the plaintiff would never, in his 
opinion, b~ able to do permanent work. According to this 
witness, his resistance is very poor and he could only work 
for a short period of time. This witness likewise expressed 
his opinion, over the objection of the defendant (R., p. 43), 
that the plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled when 
he first saw him in April, 1931, but admitted on cross exami-
nation that his prognosis is subject to modification by actual 
demonstration of the man's ability to 'vork ''for a good 
long period of time" (R., p. 45). Dr. John Hundley was 
also called as a witness (R., p. 46), stating that he saw thfl 
plaintiff in the winter of 1932-1933, when he found that the 
plaintiff's chest was definitely involved, with diminished 
respiration. The witness stated that the condition which 
he found began prior to April, 1932 (R., p. 47), and stated 
that at the time of trial the man is definitely disabled from 
work (R., p. 48). He further stated that a man in his con-
dition should not subject himself to any sustained physical 
effort for a period of days. On cross examination he ad-
mitted that his present expression of opinion as to the plain-
tiff's ability to do work at some day in the past was the equiva-
lent of a guess (R., p. 49), and that the malady with which 
the plaintiff was affected was progressive in its nature. 
The sole defense in the case 'vas that since the date of his 
release from the employ of the Foundry Company in April, 
1932, the plaintiff had actually engaged in work for compen-
sation, to an extent and under circumstances which negatived 
total disability, and that, therefore, he was not entitled to 
recover. In support of this defense petitioner proved by the 
witness Caldwell (R., p. 52) that, commencing June 27, 1932, 
less than ninety days after the plaintiff's release from the 
Foundry Company, the plaintiff worked under this witness 
as an employee of the City of Lynchburg, performing manual 
labor from day to day until October 12, 1932, when, of his 
own volition, he quit the job without assigning any reason 
for so doing. This witness was followed by another City em-
ployee, T. T. Decker (R., p. 70), introduced by the plaintiff 
in rebuttal, who testified that the plaintiff came to the City 
as a relief worker, being sent by the .Associated Charities, 
and was paid ten cents an hour initially (R., p. 71). Later 
the plaintiff was transferred to a regular job, on the regular 
City payroll, ''because be was a good worker ( R., p. 72) ''. 
The plaintiff did not appear in rebuttal, nor was any tes-
timony offered on: his behalf even tending to show that the 
work which he admittedly did, 'vhile in the employ of the City, 
wa~ inconsequential in its· nature or accomplished at the ex-
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pense of his physical well-being to such an extent as to demou-
strate his actual inability to work. 
The jury returned a verdict in his favor in the amount 
of $397.25, representing the monthly installments of $52.50 
each, prorated from April 1, 1932, to the date when suit was 
brought. This verdict the defendant moved the court to set 
aside, as contrary to the la'v and the evidence, and to ent.er 
up final judgment for the defendant ( R., p. 5). While the 
court had this. motion under advismnent, defendant made a 
further motion (R., p. 12) to set aside the verdict and award a 
new trial, upon the ground of after-discovered evidence, a::; 
set forth in the motion. This evidence consisted of a state-
ment made by the plaintiff in applying for disability insur-
ance, acquired as an employee of the City, that he becanu-J 
disabled October 12, 1932, and also to show that in J·une, 
1932, after the cancellation of the policy involved in this suit. 
the plaintiff applied to the defendant for further insurance, 
at that time representing that his condition of health was 
good and that he had no pulmonary disease. 
Both these motions the court overruled, and on 1Iarch 5, 
1934, entered judgment for the plaintiff upon the verdict of 
the jury. 
ASSIGNl\:I:ENTS OF ERROR. 
Petitioner assigns as error the following: 
(1) The action of the court in permitting the attending 
physicians to give in evidence their opinions that the plain-
tiff was totally and permanently disabled. 
(2) The action of the court in modifying defendant's In-
struction A. 
( 3) The action of the court in overruling defendant's motiou 
to set aside the verdict and enter upon final judgment for thA 
defendant. 
These assignments \vill be discussed in their order. 
ARGUMENT. 
(1) The court erred in permitting, over defendant's oh-
jection, attending physicians to give in evidence their opinion~ 
upon total and permanent disability. · 
In substantiation of the plaintiff's claim of total and per-
manent disability, the throo physicians who attended the plaul-
tiff wexe asked to express their opinions whether the plair1-
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tiff was totally and permanently disabled. These opinions, 
given in response to this question, were based entirely upon 
physical examination 1nade at various tin1es, a.nd not upon 
any observation of the plaintiff's ability to work or the effect 
of work upon him. Dr. Wilson exan1ined him in April, 1931, 
when plaintiff was recovering from pneumonia, following 
'vhich he went under another doctor's care (R., p. 35). The 
witness, Dr. Younger, saw him then, and again in Decem-
ber, 1932 (R .. , p. 41). Dr. I-Iundley sa"r hin1 for the first 
time in December, 1932, or January, 1933. These three doc-
tors were unanimous in their finding-s that the plaintiff 'va~ 
suffering frmn fibrosis of the lungs, due to inhalation of 
dust. According- to Dr. '\Tilson, this resulted in bronchitis, 
coughing and shortness of breath (R., p. 35) ; according to 
Dr. Younger, iu poor resistance and susceptibility to disease 
(R., p. 2) ; and according to Dr. Hundley, in diminished 
respiration (R., p. 48). It will be noted that none of these 
doctors saw the n1an fro1n April, 1931, until December, 1932, 
almost twenty months, during- which period he ceased u; 
work for the Foundry Company and worked for the City dur-
ing the sum1ner ·of 1932. The examinations made by Drs. 
vVilson and Younger occurred 'vhile the plaintiff. 'vas !ill 
with pneumonia and was away from work for six month~ 
(R., p. 30). Dr. Hundley saw hiin in the winter of 1932, when. 
so far as the record shows, he had not ·worked since the pr.f1-
ceding- October. Not one doctor was ever in a position to 
say, other than in theory, to 'vha.t extent the man co·uld work. 
and each admitted on cross examination tha.t his prognosiH 
as to the per1nanency of the disability would be subject to 
change upon a showing that the man actually worked. -
In this state of the record, 've submit that it was a distinct 
invasion of the province of the jury for these witnesses to h~ 
r-~rmitted to give a categorical answer to the question then 
before both court and jury, whether the plaintiff .was. on 
April 1, 1932, both totally and permanently disabled. ThesP 
witnesses answered the question of disability solely upo1~ 
data .obtained fron1 physical examination. The jury waH 
to answer the same question upon all the evidence. More-
over, the doctor expressh1g an opinion as to total and per-
manent disability n1ight have had in mind an undefined stand-
a.rd entirely different from that 'vhich the court might pre-
~eribe in its instruction, and the witness would accordingly 
~·ive his opinion of the plaintiff's inability to work, measured 
by the witness's own varying standard and conception of 
the meaning of the term. The result would be that the jury 
might he unduly persuaded to conclude that, despite the plain-
_ ..... ~ -
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tiff's subsequent activity, he was disabled because the doc-
tors had all agreed to that effect and had so expressed their 
opinion. 
The a.d1nissibility and relevancy of medical testimony upou 
the question of disability was passed upon by the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina, in the case of Hickma;n vs. Aetna 
Life Ins. Co., (1932) 164 S. E. 878, which suit was brought 
under a group policy taken out by the Pacific Mills upon 
its employees, the policy containing the pertinent provision: 
''If any employee * * • becomes totally disabled and pre-
sumably will thereafter, during life, be unable to engage in 
any occupation or employment for wage or profit • • * such' 
employee shall be deemed to be totally and permanently dis-
abled.'' 
This certificate was issued in 1927 and was cancelled-October 
28, 1929. The plaintiff testified that she quit the· mill in 
April, 1930, for the- reason that she was entirely disabled to. 
work; that although she had he en sick for about three years, . 
she had gone on as long as she could, 'vorking only a part 
of the time during the last two years, as she had four chil-
dren to support. Her doctor testified tl1at. he saw her in 
the \vinter of 1927-28, a.t which time she had various diseases 
and ailments, upon which he based his expression of opinion 
that she was then absolutely disabled and would coNtinue 
so for the rest of her life. This suit was brought in 1931. 
Plah1tiff's counsel contended that this· .evidence made a11 
issue of fact, and that the fact that she did some work after 
the cancellation of the policy did not justify the directed 
verdict for the defendant, which the court gave at its request. 
The Supreme Court held that the trial court was correct. 
In discussing the probative value of the doctor's testimony, 
characterizing the plaintiff's condition in 1928 as ''what I 
would call ·totally disabled'', the court assumed that he did 
not intend to imply that she was reduced to a state of utter 
helplessness, and apparently had in mind some less strict 
standard of total disability. If the ·witness meant this lan-
guage to be synonymous with the expressions as construed 
by this court of the provision of insurance policies, 
''then the admitted fact that plaintiff continued to do her 
customary work in the usual manner, though perhaps inter-
lnittently, for several years thereafter, shows his statement to 
he absolutely erronequs. In other words, in the faee of this 
fact, the statement of the witness was a 1nere assertion o1· 
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expression of opin·ion of no p1·obative value, and could not 
create an issue of fact as to plaintiff's total disability. (Italics 
supplied.) As we have said, the testimony showed that p1aiu-
tifi continued to do the work she had been doing all the while, 
substantially in the -usual manner, though irregularly, to the 
date of her resignation in April or ~{ay, 1930. In fact, this is 
the only inference to be drawn from her testimony, as she <1~­
clared that she was never discharged, but quit work volun-
tarily, when she did stop, on account of her health. While 
it appeared· that plaintiff was seriously afflicted, there 'vas 
no .evidence upon which the jury could have predicated a find-
ing that she was 'totally disabled', under the court's con-
Rtruction of that term as used in a policy of this kind, before 
or at the time of the cancellation of her insurance.'' 
The admissibility of opinion evidence has tw·ice been passed 
upon by this court. The question first arose in Thornton's 
f:a.~e, 113 Va. 736, wherein the accused was tried for having 
made a false· statement of the financial condition of a bank. 
The witness was asked 'vhether he had been able to reach a 
P-onclusion that Mr. Thornton made a true statement as to 
the condition of the bank, 'vhich was answered that the state-
ment was not true, and this was· objected to. The trial court 
held the evidence admissible, and upon this sole ground a 
conviction was reversed, the Appellate Court, by Keith, P., 
commenting upon it as follows: 
''The very issue which the jury here sought to try was 
whether or not the defendant Thornton had made a trnP 
statement as to the condition of tlie bank. The question and 
answer take that issue from the jury and submit it to the 
witness, and upon that evidence alone, if admissible, tlH~ 
prisoner might have been found guilty." 
Practically the same question arose in the case of 1J1.itchell 
vs. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 541, involving a.n indictment for 
making false entries on bank books. Over the objection of 
the accused the trial court permitted a witness to answer the 
question, ''Will you state whether or not the. effect of such 
entries made upon the books of the bank -would be to eonceal 
the true state of the account of John Mitchell in the bankt" 
This question an~ answer 'vere like,vise held inadmissible . 
• Judge Burks, delivering the opinion of the court, commenting 
upon it as follows : 
''The question was a leading one, put to a witness not shown 
to be an expert. But whether expert or not, it called for 
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the opinion of the witness upon what was practically the 
very issue to be tried by the jury, and not to what was dis-
closed by the books of the bank. He was asked as to the 
effect of such entries. This was a question to be deter-
mined by the jury from the evidence in the case. and not from 
the opinion of an adverse witness.'' 
We submit, therefore, that it was error to perinit the 
doctors to express their conclusions upon the very question 
that 'vas before the jury, and that these doctors should have 
been limited to a delineation of the facts connected with the 
plaintiff's physical condition as they found it. 
(2) The court erred in an1ending defendant's Instruction 
A. 
Under the circumstances of this case as set out above we 
conceive it to be law, on principle· and authority, that when 
tho defendant has established that the plaintiff had done work 
for compensation, since the date of the policy termination~ 
the plaintiff must again resume the burden of showing that, 
despite these activities, he was disabled, and that he did 
not, in fact, do the wot·k or 'vas unable to do it. Defendant, 
therefore, tendered its Instruction .1\ as follows: 
''The Court instructs the jury that in order to recover 
in this case the plaintiff n1ust show, by a preponderance of 
credible evidence, that on or before April 1, 1932, the date 
when the policy of insurance sued upon was cancell€d, tile 
plaintiff, as a result of bodily injury or disease, became per-
manently, continuously and wholly prevented from pe-rforming 
any work for compensation, or profit. And if the jury believe 
from the evidence that since April 1, 1932, the date when 
the insurance afores-aid was cancelled, the plaintiff has en-
gaged in any occupation or performed any work for corn-
pensation or profit, they must find for the defendant.'' 
This instruction properly put this burden on the plaintiff, 
in the language of the policy, and told the jury that unle::;s 
the plaintiff made proper explanation of these activities they 
n1ust find for the defendant. The court, however, modified 
the last sentence of the instruction, making it read as follows, 
the added words being italiciz.ed : 
'.'And if the jury believe from the e·videnee that since April 
1. 1932, the da.te when the insurance aforesaid was cancelled, 
the plaintiff· has been able reason,ably to engage in any occu-
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pation or perform· any work for compensation or profit as 
set out in the instructions read and conside·red as a whole, 
they should find for the defendant.'' 
This addition referred the jury to plaintiff's Instruction 
No. 2, 'vhich told them that the performance of work does 
not nec,essarily preclude recovery, if the jury believe that 
<J.isability began prior to cancellation and that the plaintiff 
was then unable to work. We submit that this was confusing 
to the jury and gave them no assistance in deciding whether. . 
they were entitled to look to the plaintff for some explanation 
of the work admittedly done or whether, despite the affirma-
tive defense, they were still at liberty to say, arbitrarily, 
that, notwithstanding the performance of the work, the plain-
tiff was, nevertheless, totally and permanent disabled. In the 
absence of an explanation from the plaintiff, defendant "'as 
entitled to have the jury instructed that the plaintiff could 
not recover until he sho,vs that the acts admittedly done mani-
fested no ability on his part. Unde·r the amendment of the 
instruction the jury was free to find that the plaintiff's sub-
sequent activities had no effect upon the case whatever, if they 
should believe that he was disabled before he embarked upon 
the work. Obviously this loses sight of the requirement that 
the disability, even though total at the time of cancellation. 
must also be permanent, and told the jury that if he was 
once disabled he was pern1anently disabled, even though able 
to work at a gainful occupation. 
We submit that this modification of the instruction 'vas 
confusing to the jury and prejudicial to the defendant, who 
was entitled to an instruction presenting its theory of the 
case and reserving to it the benefit of plaintiff's failure to 
carry the burden of proof. 
( 3) The verdict is contrary to the evidence ·and without the 
necessary evidence to support it. 
It will be seen that the issue in this case is whether on 
April 1, 193~, the cancellation date of the insurance, the 
plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled ''as a result 
of bodily injury or disease, so as to. be prevented thereby 
from engaging in any occupation and performing any work 
for wage or profit''. While this defense is characteristic of 
most trials involving disability insurance,, the case presents 
one nov:el f·eature, in that, according to the record, the plain-
tiff tacitly, without explanation or extenuation, admits that 
subsequent to cancellation date, and over a period of almost 
four months, he performed the hard manual labor, grading 
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streets, shoveling rock and wheelbarrowing rock to the con-
crete mixer (R., p. 54), "right down in the street with a pick 
and' shovel, grading up the streets" (R., p. 61)._ These tasks 
speak for themselves as being· substantial, physical work, 
not of an inconsequential nature, nor merely incidentally or 
casually performed. The question then becomes whether a 
plaintiff claiming total and permanent disability, who admits 
that subsequent to the date of the alleged disability he did 
hard physical work, can recover for. disability 'vithout show-
ing that the work which he· admitted doing was trivial or be-
yond his actual capacity. 
By way of showing the character and extent of the work 
which the plaintiff admits . doing in the summer of 1932, fol-
lowing the date of his alleged disability, we have prepared 
a summary showing the number of hours which he actually 
put in and was paid for. This summary is compiled from 
the testimony of the witness, R. B. Caldwell, who was a 
foreman of construction and the immediate superior of the 
plaintiff, who \Vorked as a laborer at the concrete mixer or 
with pick and shovel on the street. It will be noted that the 
plaintiff was in the employ of the City of Lynchburg from 
June 27, 1932, until October 12, 1932, a period of 107 days; 
including Sundays and holidays. Following his employment 
on June 27th, plaintiff worked every available day and hour 
for twelve working days, until ,July 11th, when he was absent 
for unexplained reasons for three days, during 'vhich work 
was available to him. During the next sixteen working days 
he made every available hour, until August 3rd, when he was 
ag·ain.absent for three days. During the next twenty working 
days he makes every available hour, and on August 31st he 
was absent for a half da.y and for two days following. Ap-
parently he returned on Saturday, September 3rd, for a 
half day, and was absent on 1\:fonday, the 5th, for the entire 
day, following \Vhich, with the exception of one day, Septem-
ber 19th, and a half- da.y, October 6th, his work record con-
tinues unbroken for twenty-eight working days, up to October 
12th; when, after the completion of his day's work, he left 
the job without assigning any reason. During this period 
of time there were available 744 hours of work, of which the 
plaintiff actually worked and \Vas paid for 642 hours, more 
than 86 per cent of the time available for ·work. 
It will also be seen that, while the plaintiff did not avail 
himself of 102 hours, during which the other forces were at 
work, it is also true that on at least three occasions he put 
in extra time, that is, he worked at a time when most, if not 
·all, of the men on the same job did not work. This happened on 
July 15th and 16th, and again on September 24th. As to 
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these occasions, his Foreman, :&fr. Caldwell, testified that on 
July 15th and 16th most of the men were out (R., p. 55), and 
~ince there was··· something to be unloaded, such as gravel, 
~and or cement, the plaintiff was called back to assist in 
this extra work. This occurred again on September 24th, 
when the plaintiff worked five hours, while some of the men 
made but two hours (R., p. 58}. 
As pointed out above, the plaintiff's compensation, _which 
'vas ten cents an hour to begin with, was increased to hvcnty-
:five cents per hour on July 14th (R., p. 54). This was ex-
plained by the plaintiff's witness, :Nir. Decker, that when tne 
plaintiff was assigned to the regular City forces, because be 
was a good worker, his rate of pay was changed on July 
14th. 
No explanation whatever is offered for the plaintiff's failure 
to 'vork. An unsuccessful attempt was made on the cross 
examination of defendant's witness, Caldwell, to establish 
by this witness that he had been on charity before he came 
to work for the City, but the witness professed ignorance 
of the facts (R., p. 60). The witness admitted that on two 
occasions (R., p. 69), when the weather was very hot, the 
.plaintiff was sick and he sat in the shade for a while. The 
witness also recalls that he lost several days on account of 
sickness (R., p. 65), and on one occasion the witness asked 
the plaintiff what his trouble was and he said he was ''just 
giving out", that he had something ''like the thumps'' (R., 
p. 64). The witness expressed his confidence (R., p. 67) that 
the plaintiff's lost time was due to his inability to work, 
which he inferred from the plaintiff's failure to ascribe his 
absence to a.ny, other ground. Other than this conjectural 
expression, the record fails to shed any light on two important 
questions 'vhich arise after a showing that the plaintiff did 
this work: (1) What physical effect did the work have upon 
the plaintiff from which a jury might draw an inference that 
he was, in fact, 'ltnable to perform the work which he did; 
and (2) whether the work which he actually did was so 
inconsequential as not to be dignified by the title of work. 
In applying for disability insurance, the plaintiff made 
answer to a pertinent question as to the date of his disability 
as follows (R., p. 21): 
''5. On what date were you first totally disabled by ibis 
sickness or injury so that you were wholly unable to work? 
October 11, 1932. '' 
We submit that upon a showing that the plaintiff ac.tually 
did this work it became incumbent upon him, under the 
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bu1·den of p1·oof which remained upon hin1 throughout the 
entire trial, to show either that the duties which he perforllled 
were trivial and incidental or that the work which he did was 
so expensive to his well~being as to manifest no ability to 
'vork or amount to no more than an a-ttempt at work. 
This burden of proof the plaintiff failed to carry. It lay 
within his knowledge and power to testify in rebuttal and 
to answer the questions which it then became incumbent upon 
him to answer. His failure to testify cannot justifiably be 
ascribed to his poor English. His counsel were aware in 
advance of trial of this defect and should have made pro-
vision for it by getting a proper interpreter. As the·record 
now stands the plaintiff made no attempt to carry the burden 
thus cast upon hin1, by giving facts. upon which a verdict in 
his favor might be found. TlJe jury was left to speculate 
and to conjecture whether his absence from the job was due 
to his physical reaction to the strain of the work which he 
did, when otlter,vise it might be ascribed as well to a passing 
sickness of another nature, to inclement weather, or to the 
necessity of transacting other business. 
His failure to testify in rebuttal of this showing that he 
performed hard manual work over a period of about four 
months is fatal to his right to recover in this case. This 
failure on his part to explain the nature of his work or its 
effect upon him of the cause of his quitting the job is tne 
legal equivalent of a failure to carry the burden of proof 
and is fatal to recovery. 
The defendant does not wish to be understood as contend-
ing for a literal construction of the policy, that is, for the 
proposition that the insured must be. a hopeless paralytic, 
or bedridden, before he caii. recover. Repeated decisions of 
this a~d other courts have fixed the liberality with which 
the policy contract has been construed. On the other hand, 
this liberality of construction is not without its limits under 
the peculiar terms of the policy contract here involved. At-
tention is called to the fact that this policy is primarily life 
insurance, with provisions for payment in case of disability. 
In that respect it differs from a policy issued solely for the 
purpose of providing insurance against accident or failing 
health, aud consequently the liberality with "rhich policieR 
of the latter class are construed in favor of the insured 
should not necessarily characterize a consideration of the 
policy in question. This distincti.on is thus pointed out by 
.Judg·e Sibley in the case of llletropolita;n Life lnsttrance Com-
pany vs. Foster, (C. C. A., 5th Circuit, 1933) 67 F. (2d) 264: 
"We have no more right to enlarge the liability by artifiCial 
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construction o.f the policy than to increase the penalty o1 a 
bond or raise the face of a promissory note. This policy 
is not primarily a health and accident insurance designed to 
ind~mnify for loss of wages in an employment, but is an-
nually renewable life insura.nee. Ill health and accident are 
introduced to save the insurance when by a total and per-
manent disability it is likely to be lost because it cannot 
longer be carried, and the amount of it is thereupon made 
payable in installments beginning at once instead of at death. 
Thus to accelerate the maturity of the policy the parties 
have agreed on the necessity of a disability of the sort de-
scribed to be a substitute for the death that must otherwise 
have occurred. It is not surprising that the disability to be 
recognized under these eircumstances is to be really a total 
one. There is no occasion to strain the words as has some-
ti.nies been done when health and accident insurance is the 
sole object of the policy, in order to make it afford a reason-
able protection.'' 
Our contention is that, since ability is the antithesis of 
disability, a showing that the insured has demonstrated, by 
actually working for wages, his ability to work, makes out a 
case against recovery, unless and until the plaintiff shows 
that his activities were too trivial to constitute work or, for 
his own good, should never have been undertaken, and but 
for his necessities wmtld never have been undertaken, thai 
where disability of greater or less degree has been shown, 
proof and defense that the insured has been active in busi-
ness duties has been held to require, as a condition to re-
covei'Y; that the plaintiff shall in turn show that the work ad-
mittedly done was, in fact, (1) so inconsequential as not to 
amount to work, or (2) was so detrimental to the pla_intiff's 
physical welfare as to demonstrate that his activity reflected 
his necessity, rather than his ability. · 
Upon this basis the court ha.ve rested their decisions 1n 
disability cases, not only upon the question of disability but 
also upon the subordinate question of the extent, if any, to 
which the opinion of medical experts upon the matter of 
total disability is of probative value .. 
That evidence of continued busine1?S activity negatives dis-
ability and demands of the plaintiff. a further showing· that 
his work was inconsequential or begotten of necessity is 
clearly showu in an able ~pinion of the Supreme Court of 
Alabama, in the case of New York Life Insurance Company 
vs. Torrance, (Ala., 1932) 141 So. 547. In t;hat case, Dr .. Tor-
rance, a.n eminent surgeon, of extensive practice, sued to 
recover under a. policy which provided for-· payments, when 
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proof is ·furnished, prior to the sixtieth birthday of the in-
sured, • 
''that the insured has become wholly disabled by bodily in-
jury or disease so that he is and will be presumably thereby 
permanently and continuously prevented from engaging in 
any occupation whatsoever for remuneration and profit". 
Evidence was adduced to show that as early as 1925 the 
plaintiff manifested symptoms of a serious nervous disorder, 
not diagnosed until 1930, which became increasingly in-
capacitating, so that at his sixtieth birthday, in 1928, he per~ 
formed operations with difficulty and had to force himself 
to work, :finally giving up his pr.actice in 1930. In defense, 
an elaborate array of evidence was produced showing the doc-
tor's continued activities subsequent to his sixtieth birthday. 
B:is contract representation of insurance companies was not 
terminated until1930, and he continued in active practice until 
that time. The Supreme Court noted an absence of any tes-
timony justifying the conclusion that -
~'during the period here in question the insured suffered· 
any impairment as to his skill as a physician and surgeon. 
At the most his work was made somewhat more difficult and 
his movements some slower, but the record is persuasive he 
did his work ably and well.'' 
The court also concluded that the insured-, during this 
period, did, in fact, do all the material acts necessary to the 
prosecution of his profession, in substantially his customary 
and usual manner. After this showing in defense, apparently 
the plaintiff~ who admitted the facts, failed to testify either 
as to the difficulty or necessity of doing that 'vhich he did. 
There was a judgment for plaintiff, from which an appeal 
was taken. 
Counsel for the insured, when met with proof of continued 
activity, replied that, notwithstanding the performance by 
the insured of his work in the usual and cnstomary manner, 
evidence to the effect that common care and prudence required 
that he desist therefrom, in order to effect a cure or arrest 
the progress of the dis·eases, sufficed to establish total dis-
ability. vVhile recognizing this doctrine, which the court char-
acterized as the "rule of common care and prudence", the 
court deemed it inapplicable in this case and reviewed at 
length the authorities which gave rise to the rule, quoting 
with approval from Continental Casualty Company vs. 
1¥ynne, 36 Okl. 325, 129 P. 16, as follows: · 
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- ''The court, after instructing that before plaintiff could 
recover it must be shown that the injury caused total and 
continuous disability to engage in any labor or occupation, 
then qualified the language by adding 'that, even though 
during the time he claimed to be totally and continuously 
disabled he did perform some trivial services', such fact 
should not, of itself, be so construed 'as to prevent plain~ 
tiff from recovering for all of said time, if you find from the 
evidence that he was at the time of said trivial services 
unable to have performed them. The test is, not whether 
the plaintiff did perform any services of any character, but 
whether the plaintiff was able to perform services of any 
sort or character', etc. This instruction was given t~ cover 
evidence that, while 'vounded and unable to work or per-
form the duties of his office, or do other labor, plaintiff had 
handed to some witnesses or jurors a few subpoenas upon an 
occasion. ' ' 
The court 'R conclusion is as follows: 
''We have found no case where the rule has been applied 
as here attempted, to an insured who continues uninter-
ruptedly in the performance of the substantial and material 
s.cts of his business or profession in the, usual and custo-
mary way. To say that one 'vho so performs the duties of his 
business is wholly disabled, is a contradiction in terms. The 
rule of common care and prudence has only been applied 
to those cases ·where insured had made effort and performed 
only some of the duties, more or less imperfectly, though 
suffering from serious accident or disease, and in answer 
to argument that such partial performance is conclusive 
against total disability. It has never been given so wide a 
scope and so extensive application as plaintiff here seeks 
to establish, and was never intended to conflict with or run 
counter to the other rule that where an insured is able to. 
and does, continuously perfor1n all the substantial and ma-
terial acts of his business, he is not totally disabled.'' 
·Another case in point is that of Cato vs . .A.etna, (Georgia. 
1927) 138 S. E. 787, wherein the administrator's insured 
brought suit under a group policy, basing his claim upon 
the allegation that before the insurance was cancelled the in-
sured became tota.lly and permanently disabled, due to tuber-
culosis. The policy defined total disability by the condition 
that the benefits would be payable if 
''such disability presumably will, during life time, prevent 
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such employee from pursuing any occupation for wages or 
profit". 
The policy was issued April 10, 1920, while plaintiff was an 
employee. The plaintiff worked until July 1, 1921, when the 
mill was shut down for lack of work. The. mill reopened 
December 15, 1921, but the insured did not return to work 
there then or ever. In September, 1921, insured worked in 
another mill continuously from September 17, 1921, to March 
25, 1922. He was out for three weeks, and worked from 
April 22, 1922, to May 20, 1.922. During the period from 
September, 1921, to January, 1922, the mill was operated 
651 hours, and insured worked all of these but 48, earning 
$101.50 during the pe-riod. From January, 1922, to lVIay, 
1922, the mill was operated 830 hours, of ·which he worked 
555. 
The policy of insurance in question was cancelled January 
14, 1922, and ·insured died April, 1923. Several doctors testi-
fied of consultations with him in early 1921, and he then had 
tuberculosis in such an advanced stage that he ought not to 
work. 
The Appellate Court, after discussing generally the mean-
ing of "total disability", stated that if the insured had quit 
hi.~ occupation on account of his disease, then, under the 
P.videncc of the medical experts· that it· was unwise for him 
to work in the condition of his health, it would have been 
for the jury to say whether ordinary care required him to 
nbandon his occupation and whether he. was totally disabled, 
under the principle of law that these matters are ordinary 
questions of fact for the jury. 
"Total disability does not mean absolutely physical in-
a.bility to work at one's occupation, or to pursue any occu-
pation for wages or gain; but it exists if the injury or disease 
of the insured is such that common care and prudence re-
quired him to desist and he did in fact desist from transacting 
his business. It is sufficient if the insured's sickness was of 
such a character that ordinary care required or authorized 
him to desist and he did desist from pe-rforming the labors 
incident to his occupation: in such circumstances total dis-
ability exists." · 
Referring to. t)le man's work record from September, 1921, 
to ,January, 1922, prior to cancellation, the court observed 
that the insured earned about 42 per cent of what an ex-
perienced weayer could have earned, and from that time until 
the following May earned more than 34 per cent of a compe-
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tent weaver"s earnings, during whic~ period he worked about 
one-third of the time that the mill was in operation; and con-
cluded that a :finding 'vas demanded that the insured had not 
sustained total disability. 
In the case of United States vs. Seattle Trust Company, 
(C. C. A., 9th, November, 1931), the Trust Company, as guar-
dian, brought suit to recover for disability· occurring prior 
to the lapse of the soldier's policy in February, 1919. Evi-
dence of his physical deterioration during the subsequent 
years was abundant. The defense showed his various work-
ing activities from tha.t time until trial, though his mental 
difficulties were constantly increasing. There was no medi-
cal testimony to the effect that the· work would aggravate 
his condition. Subsequent to the lapse of his policy his ner-
vous system gradually gave way, until he became permanently 
and totally disabled, despite which the court held him . not 
entitled to recover and reversed the findings of the District 
Court upon this conclusion. · 
"Tn this case the fact is that he did work, and there is no 
testimony to justify the conclusion that he was not able to 
work; tbat is, that he was not able to do what he did in fact 
do." (Italics supplied.) 
While it is recognized tha.t a. Federal decision is not bind-
ing on this court, yet it must be borne in mind that pater-
nalistic legislation makes the provisions of war risk insur-
ance unusually liberal, and any decision which denies recovery 
to the favored soldier should be highly persuasiv-e in its 
reasoning. 
CONCLUSION. 
Tt is respectfully submitted that upon the whole record 
the plaintiff has not made out a case for recovery. It does 
not deny that sul;>sequent to the date of his allege(l disability 
be actually worked at hard physical labor over an appreciable 
period of time and with reasonable continuity, for compen-
sation presumably no less in atnount than he had customarily 
received. This evidence stands undenied and unchallenged 
and unexplained by any statement tending to minimize his 
toil or demonstrating that the work was done under the spur 
of ne~essity or with untoward results. His employer testi-
fied tha.t while in the employ of the City he did his work 
effectively and ·well-so well, in fact, that he 'vas favored 
above his fellows and given extra time. So far as the record 
shows, he might have continued on that job indefinitely, had 
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he not chosen t~ quit for some reason that he has not dis-
closed. Neither he nor his doctors testified that the work 
which he did had any bad effects or aggravated his trouble, 
nor did any physician ever advise him that, for his own good, 
he should stop work. And finally, when he himself submitted 
his present claim, he fixed the commencement of his alleged 
disability at the time when he ceased to work for the City, 
more than six months after his insurance expired. 
Wherefore, petitioner prays that this Honorable Court will 
award to your petitioner its writ of error, and that the judg-
ment hereinbefore complained of may be reviewed and re-
versed. 
Counsel for petitioner desire to state orally the reasons for 
reviewing the decision complained of, and to that end, and 
in conformity with Rule II of this court, have delivered to 
Mr. W. H. Jordan, opposing counsel in the trial court, on the 
30th day of April, 1934, a copy of this petition, which petition 
it will adopt as its opening brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
1\'IETROPOLITAN LIFE INS.URANCE 
COMPANY, 
By HARRISON, LONG & WILLIAMS, 
Its Attorneys. 
The undersigned, attorneys at law, practicing in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, certify that, in our 
opinion, it is proper that the proceedings and judgment of 
the Corporation Court of the City of Lynchburg, in the action 
of Wladyslave Krupel vs. Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany, should be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Appeals. 
Given under our hands this 30th day of April, 1934. 
Filed ~lay 7, 1934. 
SAMUEL H. WILIIIAMS, 
DOUGLAS A. ROBERTSON. 
H. B. G.· 
June 14, 1934. Writ of error and su.persedeas awarded by 
the court. Bond, $500. 
Received June 18, 1934. · , 
M. B. W. 
M.B. W. 
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(a) On this date he·commenced work in regular employment. . 
(b) "Some of the men made four hours and some ten hours (R., p. 33)." 
(c) "Most of the men were out and he happened to be the one person that came back (R., p. 55)." 
(d) "On Tuesday he was out; the most of the men were out (R., p. 56)." , 
(e) "Some of the men made four hours that day and some nine hours (R., p. 56)." 
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(f) Nobody worked. · 
(g) "Some of the men made five hours; some six hours and some nine hours, but I would say that the majority made five hours that ~-..... F day (R.1 p. 57)." (h) "Some of tne men made two hours and some five hours (R., p. 58)." 
(i) "The majority of the men made five hours that day (R., p. 59)." 
Summary of the testimony of the witness R. B. Caldwell (R., pp. 53-60). 
Note: The figures in italics denote that the other employees worked a greater or less time than Krupel. Unless thus shown he worked the 
same number of hours in a given day that the others worked. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Honorable Aubrey E-. Strode, judge of 
the corporation court for the city of Lynchburg, at the 
courthouse thereof, on the 5th day of March, 1934, and in 
the 158th year of the Commonwealth. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit, on the 21st day 
of October, 1933, Wladyslave ICrupel, by 1J1. ess. R. C. Vvood 
and W. H. Jordan, his attorneys, caused to be returned to 
and filed in the clerk's office of the corporation court for 
the city of Lynchburg, his notice of motion for judgment for 
n1oney, against Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, which 
said notice, having been duly serv:ed on the said defendant, 
is in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
page 2 } To ~Ietropolitan Life Insurance Company: . 
Please Take Notice that on the 1st day of the No-
vember term, 1933, of the Corporation Court for the City 
of Lynchburg, State of Virginia, the undersigned (herein-
after called the plaintiff) will move the said court for a 
judgment against you (hereinafter called the defendant) in 
the sum of $2·,000.00, as damages due by the defendant to 
the plaintiff by reason of the ·breach of a certain contract 
of insurance, as. hereinafter mor~ fully set forth, to-wit: 
(1) That on the 31st day of October, 1925, the defendant 
issued to the plaintiff, as an employee of Lynchburg Foundry 
Company, a certificate of Insurance, Serial #1102, under 
Group Policy #1996G, which said Group Policy was issued 
to said Lynchburg Foundry Company and is now in its pos-
session, in the sum of $2,000.00 (which said certificate of in-
surance has been lost or destroyed and cannot now be pro-
duced); 
(2) T~at the said certificate of insurance provided amongst 
other things for the payment of ''Total and Pern1anent Dis-
ability Benefits'' in the sum of $52.50 monthly for a period 
of forty-two months, in the event that the plaintiff should 
become totally and permanently disabled as: a result of bodily 
injury or disease so as to be prevented permanently from 
engaging in any occupation or from performing any work 
for compensation or profit while insured under the said ·Cer-
tificate of Insurance and prior to his sixtieth birthday; 
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(3) That while the said insurance was in force 
.page 3 } and prior to the plaintiff's sixtieth birthdaJ:, t_o-
wit, on the 17th day of l\{arch, 1932, the plaintiff 
became totally and permanently disabled, and still is to-
tally and permanently disabled, as a result of bodily injury 
and disease within the meaning of the terms of the said Cer-
tificate of Insurance; 
(4) That the plaintiff has performed all the conditions 
of the said Certificate of Insurance and of the said Group 
Policy and has violated none of the prohibitions of same; 
( 5) That the defendant has been duly notified of the said 
total and permanent disability of the plaintiff and yet, al-
though often requested so to do, hath neglected and failed 
to pay to the plaintiff the said benefits or any part thereof, 
and in such manner hath breached its said contract .of in-
surance with the plaintiff, to the dan1age of the plaintiff in 
the sum of $2,000.00. 
Respectfully, 
WLADYSLA VE KRUPFT,. 
By R. C. WOOD & W. H. JORDAN, Counsel. 
Lynchburg·, Virginia, October. 19, 1933. 
R. C. WOOD AND W. H. JORDAN, p. q. 
page 4 ~ At another day, to-wit, at Lynchburg Corpora-
tion Court, January 19th, 1934. 
This day came the parties by their attorneys, and upon 
motion of the plaintiff, leave is granted him to :file his 
amended notice of motion for judg·ment in this case, and 
the same is accordingly filed. Thereupon, the defenda;nt filecl 
in writing its demurrer to the plaintiff's amended noticA of 
motion for judgment, together with the grounds thereof, in 
which demurrer the plaintiff joins, and said demurrer having 
been argued, the court, being of the opinion that the said 
amended notice of motion is sufficient in law, doth overrule 
said demurrer, to which ruling of the court the defendant by 
its attorneys excepted. And on motion of the plaintiff, it 
is ordered that the defendant do furnish to the plaintiff a 
statement of its grounds of defense on or before the 19th 
day of January, 1934. Thereupon, the defendant for plea 
says that it did not undertake and promise in manner and 
form as the plaintiff in his amended notice of motion for 
judgment against it has complained, and of this it puts itself 
upon the country, and the plaintiff likewise. And said de-
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fendant filed by leave of court a statement in writing of its 
grounds of defense, to which the plaintiff replies generally, 
and prays that the same be inquired of by the country, and 
the defendant likewise. And said parties demanding a jury, 
there came a jury, to-wit, W. C. Akers, H. S. Bryant, 0. B. 
Laughon, E. H. Moseley, W. M. Stevens, W. ·C. Rosser, Jr., 
and Willard F. White, who were ·sworn to try the 
page 5 r issue. joined, and having heard the ~vidence and ar-
gument of counsel, returned the following verdict, 
to-wit, "We the jury find for the plaintiff and assess his 
damages in the sum of $397.25. H. S. Bryant, Foreman". 
Thereupon, the defendant by its attorneys, moved the court 
to set aside said verdict on the ground that it is contrary 
to the law and the evidence and on the further ground of 
errors in the instructions to the jury, and enter up final judg-
ment for the defendant, and the court not ·being advised of 
its judgment to be given in the premises, takes time to con-
sider thereof. 
page 6 ~ A:NIENDED NOTlGE OF ~IOTION. 
To Metropolitan Life Insurance Company: 
Please Take Notice that on the 1st day of the November 
term, 1933, of the corporation court for the city of Lynch-
burg·, state of Virginia, the undersigned (hereinafter called 
the plaintiff) will move the said court for a judgment against 
you (hereinafter called the defendant) in the sum of $2,000.00, 
as damages due by the defendant to the plaintiff by reason 
of the breach of a certain contract of insurance, as herein-
after more fully set forth, to-wit: 
(1) That heretofore, to-wit, on the 31st day of October, 
1925, the defendant issued to the plaintiff, as an employee of 
Lynchburg· Foundry Company, its certificate of insurance, 
to-wit, Serial #1102, under Group Policy #1996 (which said 
Group Policy was issued to Lynchburg Foundry Co.mpany 
and is now in its possession) in the sum of $1,000.00 (which 
said certificate of insurance has been lost or destro·yed and 
cannot now be produced) ; 
(2) That on the 31st day of October, 1925, the defendant 
also issued to the plaintiff, as an employee of Lynchburg 
~Foundry Company aforesaid, an additional certificate or 
"rider'' to be attached to the certificate of insurance afore-
said and made a part thereof (which· said additional cer-
tificate or ''rider'' has been lost or destroyed and cannot 
now be produced), whereby the said insurance was 
page 7 r increased to $2,000.00; . 
( 3) That the· said certificate of insurance and the 
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said '~-rider'' and said group policy provided, amongst other 
thing~, .for the payment of ''Total and Permanent Disability 
Benefits'' in the sum of $52.50 in equal monthly installments 
for forty months; in the event that the plaintiff should be-
com,e totally and permanently disabled as a result of bodily 
injury suffered or disease contracted while the said insur-
ance was· in force and prior to his sixtieth birthday, so as 
to be permanently, continuously and wholly prevented there-
by from performing any work for compensation or profit. 
( 4) That while the said insurance was in force and prio-r 
to the plaintiff's sixtieth birthday, to-wit, on the· 17th day 
of March, 1932, the plaintiff beca.n1e permanently, continu-
ously, and wholly disabled, and still is permanently, con-
tinuously, and wholly disabled, as a result of bodily injury 
suffered and disease contracted, within the meaning of the 
terms of the said certificate of insurance ; 
(5) That the plaintiff has performed all the conditions of 
the said certificate of insurance and the said "rider" and 
of the said Group Policy and has violated none of the pro-
hibitions of same; 
( 6) That the defendant has been duly notified of the said 
total and permanent disability of the plaintiff and yet, al-
though often requested so to do, hath neglected and failed 
to pay to the plaintiff the said benefits or any part thereof, 
and in such manner hath breached its said contract of in-
surance with the plaintiff, to the damage of the 
page 8 ~ plaintiff in the sum of $2,000.00. 
Respectfully, 
WLADYSLA VE KRUPEL. 
By W. H. JORDAN, Counsel. 
Lynchburg, Virginia, October 19, 1933. 
R. C. WOOD AND W. H. JORDAN, p. q. 
page 9 ~ DE:NIURR.ER. 
The defendant, by its attorney, ca·mes and says that the 
plaintiff's notice of motion is not sufficient in law, and as-
signs as ground therefor that a portion of the amount sued 
for was not due at the time this suit was commenced, as 
:v:ill appe3:r fr~m. said notice. of motion, plaintiff's re~overy, 
1f any, being hm1ted to the· Instalments due and payable in 
the event of disability after due proof thereof has ·been filed. 
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as required by the policy contract, and prior to the eom-
mencement of this suit. 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE GOMP ANY, 
By Counsel. 
HARRISON, LONG & WILLIAMS p. d. 
page 10 ~ GROUNDS O·F DEFENSE. 
Upon the trial of this case the defendant will defend upon 
the ground that the plaintiff was not totally and permanently 
disabled as defined by the policy contract, prior to the can-
cellation of the policies of insurance upon which this suit 
is brought. 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO~IP A.NY, 
By Counsel. 
HARRISON, LONG & 'VILLIAMS p. d. 
And now at this day, to-wit, at Lynchburg Corporation 
Court, March 5th, 1934, the date first hereinbefore men-
tioned. 
This day came the parties by their attorneys, and the plain-
tiff filed his written motion to -set aside the verdict of the 
jury rendered in this case on the 19th of January, 1934, and 
enter up judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $2,000.00, 
the full amount of damag·es as shown by the policy of in-
surance produced in evidence at the trial of this case, and 
said motion being argued, the court overruled the same, and 
the plaintiff excepted. ....L\.nd the defendants motion made on 
the 19th day of Jan., 1934, to set aside said verdict as c.on-
trary to the law and the evidence, and enter up final judg-
ment for the defendant, having been argued, the court over-
ruled the same, and the defendant excepted. And the defend-
ant filed its written motion to set aside said ver-
page 11 r diet on the ground of after-discovered evidence, 
and grant it a ne'v trial, and said motion having 
been argued, the court overruled the same, and the defendant 
excepted. 
It is therefore considered by the court that the plaintiff 
recover against the defendant, ~fetropolitan Life Insurance 
Co., the sum of $397.25, the amount of the damages by the 
jurors in their verdict aforesaid ascertained and assessed, 
with legal interest thereon· from this day until paid, and 
his costs by him about his motion in this behalf expended. 
At the instance of the defendant which by" its attorneys in-
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timated its intention of applying for writ of error and super· 
sedeas, the court doth order that execution of the foregoing 
judgment be suspended for a period of sixty days, provided 
that said defendant or some one for it execute before the 
clerk of this court a proper suspending bond in the penalty 
of $100.00, conditioned according· to law. 
The defendants written ·motion to set aside verdict .on 
ground of a!te1·-disoover evidence, referred to in th'~ fore-
going order, is in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
page 12} MOTION TO SET A.SIDE VERDLCT FEBRU~ 
ARY TERJYI, 1934. 
Now comes the defendant, by its attorney, a:tid in addition 
to the motion already n1ade moves the court to set aside the 
verdict of the jury heretofore rendered and award a new 
trial upon the ground that since the trial of this case on J anu-
ary 19, 1934, it has discovered evidence n1aterial in its object 
. and such as on another trial ought to produce opposite re-
sults on the merits, not cumulative, corroborative or col-
lateral, which could not have been discovered before the trial 
by the ~se of due diligence, consisting of the following: 
When the plaintiff in this case became regularly employed 
by the City of Lynchburg in.July, 1H32, he thereupon became 
insured under a g·roup policy of insurance issued to the City 
of Lynchburg· by Connecticut General Life Insurance Com-
pany, No. G 5982, insuring its employees against perma-
nent total disa-bility, which said policy contains the following 
provision: 
''Any employee shall be considered permanently and to-
tally disabled, if, before attaining the age of 60, and after 
the effective· date of his insurance under this policy, he is 
unable to work, and will presumably be unable during his 
life to pursue any occupation for wages or profit * e * . '' 
Thereafter, to-wit, in June, 1933, the said plaintiff filed 
his .claim for permanent total disability, beginning October 
13, 1932, immediately following the last day during which he 
worked for said city, under which claim the said plaintiff 
'vas thereafter allowed and paid the sum of 
page 13 ~ $1,000.00. Defendant has not as yet been able to 
obtain a copy of the claim fo;r disability filed by 
the plaintiff, but believes that said document will, when pro-
duced, show that the said plaintiff claimed that his total and 
pennanent disability, incurred while in the· service of the 
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said city, arose subsequent to the caneellation date ... of the 
policy npon which this suit was brought, to-wit, Aprill, 1932 . 
.At the time of the trial aforesaid defendant knew that the 
plaintiff had recovered under a policy of insurance covering 
regular employees of the City of Lynchburg, but believing 
then that such evidence had no relevancy other than to estab-
lish the plaintiff's regular employment by the City, which 
could otherwise be proven, defendant made no further in-
vestig~tion of the facts in connection with such recovery. 
Learning· after said trial that plaintiff had recovered under 
such policy upon the · ground of permanent and total dis-
ability, defendant made further investigation, from which it 
confidently expects the results aforesaid . 
.After .April 1, 1932, the cancellation date of the policy of 
insurance upon which this suit 1vas ·brought, to-wit, under 
date of June 28, 1932, the said plaintiff applied to the defend-
ant company for a Special Class Whole Life policy of in-
surance in the amount of $1,000.00, and in his application 
therefor represented that his then condition of health was 
good, that he had no physical·or mental defects, had never 
left his work for more than one month on account of health, 
and denied specifically having any pulmonary dis-
page 14 }- eases, upon the faith of which representation the 
policy aforesaid was issued and is now outstand-
ing and in. force, the existence of which policy of insurance, 
through an error in its records, this defendant had not in-
vestigated nor ascertained at the time of the trial aforesaid. 
~1:ETROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE OOMP ANY. 
By Counsel. 
HARRISON, LONG & WlLLI:A.MS', p. d. 
pag·e 15 }- Stenographic report of testimony and other in-
cidents of the trial of the cause of Wladyslave 
Krupel, plaintiff, vs. The Metropolitan Life Insurance •Com-
pany, defendant, in the Corporation Court for the city of 
Lynchburg, Virginia, before Honorable .Aubrey E. Strode, 
;fudge of said Court, and a jury, which trial began and ended 
on the 19th day of January, 1934. 
The plaintiff was represented by Messrs. R. C. Wood and 
W. H. Jordan, and the defendant was represented by Mr. 
Samuel H. Williams. 
page 16 }- By Mr. Jordan: We 1vant to call Mr. Grossman 
as an interpreter. The plaintiff in this action 
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speaks English very imperfectly. His native language is 
German or Polish. 'Ve have a witness that we would like to 
introduce as an interpreter-Mr. Grossman. 
EVIDENCE FOR PLAINTIFF. 
lVI. GROSSMAN, 
.Sworn for plaintiff. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. Please state your name. 
By Mr. Williams: (Interupting.) I would like to ask the 
witness a question or two ·before you begin. 
Q. Mr. Grossman, what language does Mr. I{rupel speak, 
if you know! 
A. He speaks Polish, but his English is so hard to under-
stand-it is so bad it is hard to understand. 
Q.. His native language is Polish? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you speak Polish 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You don't? 
A. No, sir; I do not. 
By ~Ir. Williams: Is it your idea, ~1:r. Jordan, that he will 
interpret this man's broken English 1 
page 17 ~ By Mr. Jordan: No, sir; we asked his father 
to come, who does speak his language, and this 
morning he said he could not get here and this young man 
came instead. 
By Mr. Williams: 
Q. Do you understand P'olish T 
A. No, sir; some of the words I understand. In some 
things, you may understand him as well as I do. I will be 
glad to interpret his broken English. 
By the Court: Vve will try you anyway. 
Witness stands aside. i .' 
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W. I{RUPEL, 
Sworn in his own behalf. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. What is your name! 
A. Wladyslave Krupel. 
Q. You are the plaintiff in this case and the one claiming 
the money from the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 
are you not? Is that true or not, that you are the man claim-
ing· the money from the Insurance Company 7 
A. Y e·s, sir. · 
Q. Did you ever work for the Lynchburg Foundry Com-
pany? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Ifow long did you work for them 7 
page 15 ~ A. I started in 1920; I got cut off ~larch, 1932. 
Q. Yon were cut off in March, 1932 t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. While working for the Lynchburg Foundry Company, 
what kind of work did you do 1 . 
.A. Grinding pipe on the emery wheel. 
Q. You were grinding pipe on an emery wheel? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Explain to the Court and jury how you · became dis-
abled¥ 
By Mr. Williams: "\Ve object to the question. There is 
no proof in the record yet that he is disabled. 
By ~!r. Jordan: We will withdraw the question. 
Q. Are you able to work or not? 
A. I don't understand you. 
Q. Are you able to do any work or not' 
A. I don't understand. 
Q. Are you able to work¥ 
A. No, sir. 
By Mr. Wood: 
Q. Are you physically able to work nowf 
A. No; I no can work; I cannot work-no can at all. 
Q. 1\{r. Krupel, when did you leave the Foundry Companv 
-in March, 1932 Y . . w 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 18 } ·Q. While you worked at the Lynchburg Foun-
dry Company, prior to March, 1932, djd you .have 
any illness-w·ere you cotillned to bed from sickness 1 
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A. Been sick all the time-stay home. 
Q. What was the nature of your. sickness-what sickness 
did you have? 
A. I don't understand you. 
By Mr. Grossman: 
Q. When you were sick, what sickness did you havef What 
was the matter with you 1 
A. I got like a knife cut here (indicating)-become blind 
in the eye; I no can see ; I no can see anything. 
By Mr. Wood: 
Q. You had trouble· here (indicating )-trouble with your 
lungs? 
A. Yes, trouble with lungs all the time. 
Q. Was that when you ·were ·working for the Lynchburg 
Foundry Companyf 
A. Yes, with the Foundry Company. 
Q. N o,v, J\{r. Krupel, this work you did as a pipe grinder, 
did you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Tell the jury what you did-what you did there. How 
you ground the pipe and whether there was any dust there Y 
A. ~Ie grind pipe-me grind from emery wheel and by 
that blow dust from nose all time. 
Q. And you stopped in 1\{arch, 1932. 
page 19 ~ By 1\fr. Williams : Ife said he was cut oE 
By Mr. Wood: 
Q. Did you apply for your total and permanent disability 
to the proper authorities at the Foundry. Did you tell them· 
that you were disabled? 
By 1\tir. Williams: We object to that as leading and be-
cause it is a self-serving declaration. 
By the Court: He cannot help leading this witness. 
By Mr. Williams: Yes, sir, hut the claim of total disability 
is what I prefer that he prove by someone else. 
By the Court: He can go as far as he can with this wit-
ness and we will have to be somewhat indulgent with him. 
By Mr. Williams: Yes, sir, but not to the point of per-
mitting self-serving declarations. . 
By the Court: It will be better if you ask him-
By Mr. Wood: (Interrupting.) We will withdraw it. 
By the Court: You might ask him to what extent he could 
not work. 
By· Mr. Williams: All right; that is perfectly agreeable. 
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By Mr. Wood: You may cross examine him. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. vVilliams : 
Q .. Can you sign your name 7 
page 20 ~ A. Yes, I sign it. 
Q. Did yon sign this paper {hands to witness) Y 
A. Yes, that me sign; yes ; W. L. Krupel. 
Q. This paper headed: ''Disability ·Claim Division. ''State-
ment of Claim for Total and Permanent Disability Bene-
fits". You signed that, did you. That is your signature, is 
it (indicating)? 
A. Yes, that my sign; that my name, yes, sir. 
By Mr. Grossman: · 
Q. Did you write that (indicating)? 
A. Yes, sir. This me write (indicating). 
By Mr. Williams: . 
Q. It is dated }"'ebruary 14th, 1933; that was the date you 
signed it, was it Y 
A. I don't know. 
Q. I will offer his statement of Claim as signed by him; 
that part of this form and no other, as evidence. 
( S'aid paper so filed is marked ''Exhibit No. 1 for Defend-
ant, and is in the following words and figures, to-wit:) 
"'~!METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
"DISABILITY CLAIM~ DIVISION 





"STATE~IENT OF CLAIM FOR TOTAL AND PERl\tiA-
NENT DISABILITY BENEFITS. 
To be Completed by Employee 
'' 1. Wbat is your full name: W. L. Krupel. 
page 21 }- '' 2. Where do you live 1 1921 Anderson St. 
City: Lynchburg. State: Va. 
'' 3. Please give your personal description as follows: Age 
39; Sex-Male; ~£arried or Single: Married. Color-white. 
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"4. Nature of present sickness or injury: See medical 
report. 
'' 5. On what date were you ,first totally disabled by thia 
sickness or injury so that you were wholly unable to work: 
October 11, 1932. 
'' 6. Have you since that time engaged in any occupation 
or busines:s Y If so, state particulars. No. 
"7. On what date were you first treated by a physician Y 
October 11, 1932. 
"8. Name all physic~ans who treated you since beginning 
of this disability: Dr. A. L. Wilson; Dr. John Hundley; Dr. 
~- F. Younger. 
'' 9. Have you been confined to house by this sickness or 
- injury Y If so, how long Y From ................ , 19'. . . . to 
..................... 19 .... 
"10. If not confined to house, why are you unable to work¥ 
Nature of disease. 
'' 11. Are you now wholly unable to engage in any 'vork, 
occupation or business : Yes. 
''12. If your disability is due to accident, answer the fol-
lowing questions : 
(a) Were you at work when accident happened: 
(b) When and where did accident happen Y 
(c) Describe accident; tell how it happened. 
''13. Are you receiving benefits for this disability from any 
other Insurance Company, Society or Lodge, etc Y If so, give 
particulars. Company. . . . . . . . . . Amt. per week ......... . 
No. of weeks payable ............... . 
"14. Are you insured under any other policies issued by 
this ·Company? If so, give numbers. :See letter attached. 
"Date Febru~ry 14, 1933. Signature of Employee: 
"W. L. KRUPEL. 
page 22 ~ B·y Mr. Williams: The balance is completed by 
Dr. Younger, 'vho is here today as a witness-! 
mean Dr. Hundley. 
RE-DIRECT EXAl\fiNATION. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. Mr. Krupel, how old are you' 
A. I am 56 years oJd, coming :1\farch. 
Witness stands aside. 
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E. C. WOOD, 
Sworn for Plaintiff. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. You live in Lynchburg, Virginia, do you! 
A. I live in Amherst. 
Q. Where do you work T 
A. For the Lynchburg Foundry Company. 
Q. How long have you been employed by the Lynchburg 
Foundry Company? 
A. About 31.4 years. 
Q. Did you know lVlr. l{rupel, the plaintiff in this case, 
when he worked at the Lynchburg Foundry? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is your position at the Lynchburg Foundry? 
A. I am assistant to ~Ir. Macon Miller, the Personnel Di-
rector. 
Q. vVhat did Mr. Krupel do there at the Lynchburg Foun-
dry? 
page 23} 
A. He was a pipe grinder. 
Q. What did his duties require him to do? 
A. Nothing but grind pipe with a smaH air 
emery. . 
Q. He was a pipe grinder, using an emery wheel, you mean, 
do you 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was that a safe job or a dangerous job! 
A. I would say a danger job. 
Q. Explain why you say that? 
A. Because this continued emery dust flying up from the 
wheel all the time and no way to use a wheel like that with 
a guard on it to keep the dust down. When a man is inside 
a pipe there is no danger but when he is grinding· outside the 
emery dust continually flies up all the time from the pipe 
and the emery too. 
Q. Why else do you say it was dangerous f 
A. The dust flies up and a man has to breathe it and 
then that wheel might break and strike a man. 
Q. Is there anything to prevent a man from breathing this 
iron and emery dust? · 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you know, as Assistant Personnel Officer, whether 
or not Mr. l{rupel was insured under the Group policy in 
the 1\fetropolitan Life Insurance Company? · 
A. He was, yes, sir; all employees are insured under that. 
Q. Tell us the amount in which he was insured f · 
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A. He was insured for $2,000.00, up until April 
pag·e 24 ~ 1st, 1932. Then they changed it all and went to 
$1,000.00. . 
Q. Up to April 1st, 1932-
A. It was $2,000.00. 
Q. It was $2,000.00 under this group policy? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, it is alleged, I believe, and the group policy, too, 
sa:ys that, in the event of permanent and total disability, 
etc., he was to receive $52.50 a month; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know anything about the filing of his proof ·of 
claim; did you have anything to do with th~t Y 
A. No, sir; I did not have anything to do with that. 
By Mr. Jordan: Mr. Williams has admitted that it- was 
the 14th of February, 1933, that this proof of claim was filed. 
By Mr. Williams: No, sir. That is the date of it. 
By M~. Jordan: It was received March 3rd, 1933 . 
. Q. You don't know anything about that part of it; 
A. No, sir. 
Q. This insurance-how is the premium on it paid; who 
paid it? 
A. The employee paid part and the employer paid part 
of it; I don't know whether it is on a fifty-fifty basis or not. 
Q. How was the employee's portion paid? Did he pay that 
out of his own pocket or was it deducted from his 
page 25 ~ wages or paid in some other 'vay 1 
A. It was deducted from his wages. 
Q. Each time he got paid, he got so much less 9 
A. No-once a month. 
Q. They deducted enough to pay his portion of the pre-
mium on the policy 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So it was not a total g·ift by the company? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you happen to know anything about the man's physi-
cal condition towards the latter part of the time he worked 
at the Foundry Company? 
A. No, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Williams : 
Q .. Mr. Wood, you said you don't recall what· portion of 
the premium is paid by the company and what portion was 
paid by the employee Y · 
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A. No, sir. · : ~ · · 
Q. You said something ·-about ''fift.y-:fifty'' that I did not 
~~? - . 
A. I said I didn't know whether they paid :fifty-fifty or 
not. 
Q. You don't know that that is true? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. It might be true that the company pays slightly in ex-
cess of half? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
page 26 ~ Q. Have you had occasion to look over the time 
sheet showing this man's time for one year prior 
to leaving the company? ' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are you able to state from memory what portion of 
the available time he worked? 
A. I say he worked just about 4/5ths of the time that the 
shop worked. · 
Q. The shop was open last year prior to April 1st, 1932, 
only a few days a month? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And of the days that were available, out of every :five, 
he worked fourT 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. How much time was the .shop working during that time, 
Mr. Wood? 
A. S'ome weeks only one day, and some weeks it did not 
work any, for probably twelve months. 
Q. During that period of time, how long a· stretch of work 
did they have at once. How many days together did they 
have at once? 
A. I will say it was very seldom they had three days 
in a stretch; sometimes three or four days. 
Q. And they would seldom have three days in a stretch! 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 27 ~ ·Q. And during that period, he worked about 
4/5ths of the time the shop was running? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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T. U. Gll.,BERT, 
Sworn for Plaintiff. 
DIRECT EXMfiNATION. 
By Mr. Wood: 
Q. Where do you work? 
... A. ·At the Lynchburg Foundry Company. 
· Q. What is your occupation there? 
A. NowY 
· Q. In 19327 . 
A. I was cleaning-shed foreman at that time. 
Q. You were the foreman 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know Mr. Wladyslave L. 1\::rupelY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you known Mr. I\::rupel 7 
A. I been there-! been knowing him for just about eleven 
years-it will be this May. 
Q. Was he working at the Foundry? 
A. He was working there when I went there. 
Q. He was working there ahead of you, was he 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 28 ~ Q. What was the nature of his work¥ 
A. I didn't know much of l{rupel until 1928. 
Q. You didn't know much about him until1928Y 
A. Yes. In 1928, I -don't remember the date, but it was in 
May, they gave me this job. I 'vorked in the shop ahead 
of that. I was told, when I took the job, that he was the 
best man in the shed; naturally I kept him feeling tha.t way, 
and, in the meantime, he was the best g-rinder I had~ a11d he 
worked on in this way until, I think it was in 1931, if l am not 
mistaken, anyway when he took pneumonia-he took pneu-
monia-and after he came back to work he still continued 
grinding, but he could not do a day's work, but he did what 
he could. I say he would not do a day's work-he stayed 
on the job all day, but he could not produce what he could 
ahead of that. That is about as fair as I can tell you. The 
doctor can explain the situation much better than I can. 
Q. From the time you knew him as a pipe grinder in 1928 
to 1931, until he had pneumonia, he worked regularly, did 
he? 
A. Yes, sir; every day the shop ran. 
Q. And he was the best man at the grinde.:r! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He was a hard worker, 'vas he 1 
A. Yes, sir; you can check his record. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Wladyslave l{rupel. 37 
Q. Did the Foundry have enough work to keep him busy 
all the thne then¥ 
page 29 } A. We worked up until about the latter part of 
1929. We commenced to drop from six days to 
.five and gradually went lower from then on. 
Q. During the time that there was plenty of work, and if 
necessary worked over-time, he was given enough work to 
do, was heY 
A. He always did that and he worked Sundays, too. 
Q. Tell the jury what work he did. Explain the opera~ . 
tion of it. 
A. I could explain it in my mind. You cast a pipe in sand 
-you understand what that is-and this sand would be 
burned on the pipe-and he had an air emery grinder-run 
by air, wher~ you grind the sand off of the surface of the 
pipe, and this emery and sand dust-you lmow what air will 
do with the grinder-with the machinery right up in your 
faee. You stand there for 12 or 13 hours-and I have known 
the.m to work 15 hou1·s-and I figure it is a more or less 
serious proposition for a man to do that. 
Q. Do you consider it a dangerous job f 
A. I do. 
• Q. Was there any way to prevent this dust from getting 
1nto the lungs t 
A. There may have been but we did not know of it at the 
time. It was not used. · 
Q. He worked up to the tiine in 1931-until he had the 
attack of pneumonia, did he 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 30 ~ Q. How long was he out with pneumonia f 
A. He was out-I don't remember, but a right 
smart little period-probably, I don't know-probabl:y four 
or six months with pneumonia. ' . 
Q •. He was out of the plant there for from four to six 
months with pneumonia in 1931 T 
A. I don't know exactly, but somewhere in that period. 
Q. When he came back after the attack of pneumonia, yQu 
said he -could not work as regularly as he did beforeY 
A. No, he lost some time. lie was not working regularly. • 
We won't working but about half time when he came back 
there, ·and he could not make all of that. He would lose part 
of that time that the others worked. 
Q. He complained, did he t 
A. He complained all the time. 
Q. What did he complain off 
By Mr. Williams: We object to that. . 
By the Court: I think that is within the exception recog-
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nized by the rule-the giving· of what might be symptoms 
/ when it probably could not be reasonably anticipated that · 
any proceeding of this sort was in contemplation. Could you 
tell what is ailing a patient except from what he tells you 
of his symptoms f It is a question of good. faith. 
By Mr. Williams: Yes, sir, I know that on the good faith 
proposition, but I answer by saying that of course it is pos-
sible for a man hims.elf t~ give his own symptoms 
page 31 ~ of disabilities under which he may be laboring. 
· Of course, there must be some guarantee of spon-
taneity-there must be something super-added to take it out 
of the hearsay rule. There must be some guarantee of verity. 
By the 'Court: What more could you have--that he was 
suffering from certain symptoms. 
By 1\tir. Williams: I understand his complaint to be ad-
dressed to the nature of the work he was doing. 
By Mr. Wood: My question was-What did Krupel com-
plain of-his ailments. · 
By the Court: Had the witness stated that he did make 
complaints~ 
By 1\tir. Wood: Yes, sir; he said he came back after hav-
ing pneumonia-
By the Court : I think you can ask him that. 
Defendant excepts to ruling· of the Court for reasons 
stated. 
By 1\tir. Wood: 
Q .. 1\tir. Gilbert, tell the jury the nature of the complaints 
that Mr. Krupel n1ade as to himself¥ 
.A, •. He would come in in the mornings, and I always spoke 
to all my men as I went down the line, and I asked "How do 
you feel"; and he would say, "I don't feel so good this 
morning''; and more or less, when he started grinding, hfl 
would be coug·hing, and I did not know what his 
page 32 ~ trouble was, but he would have the coughing spells 
and sometimes he would go out and sit down 15 or 
20 minutes, and then he would come back and continue his 
· work. 
Q. He would just have coughing spells f 
A. Yes, sir, so far as I know. He said he had hurting ali 
over his chest there; I didn't kno'v what that wa~. 
Q. Were you working at the Fouhd~·y when 1\tir. }C-rupel wa,s: 
cut off from work? . • 
A. Yes, sir. · · 
Q. Did his complaints increase as the months rolled by 
()r g·et better! 
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A. He stayed about the same thing; I don't say that he 
was getting better or worse. 
Q. You don't recall 'vhat part of 1931 that was, do you Y 
A. I think it happened in the fall of the year; I don't re-
member what time it was. 
Q. When he came back to work; he had his attack in the 
fall, did he? 
A. No; he had his attack before Christmas sometime, and 
as well as I remember, it was along in the summer when he 
come back. 
Q. Probably in July? 
A. .Somewhere along there ; I don't remember; it possibly 
could have been after Christmas, but it was in the winter 
time. · 
Q. You said before ·Christmas? 
A. I think it were; possibly it could have been 
page 33 ~ after Christmas; I did not keep a record of it. I 
could have got the record, but I did. not do it. 
Q. Was that Christmas· of 1930? 
A. If it "ras before Christmas; and, if it was. after Christ-
mas, it was 1931. I don't remember which he took pneu-
monia in. 
Q. In regard to the particular job that he had, do you 
know of anyone that did the same work before. Mr. l{rupel 
had· it there? 
A. Yes, sir; they had g·rinders ahead of that, but they had 
all gone that had been there ahead of that. He was the 
longest grinder on that job to my knowing. 
Q. He stayed on the job longer than any other grinder 
they ever had, did h~ f 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXA~.fiNATION .. 
By Mr. Williams: 
Q. During the last few months before lVIr. Krupel was 
cut off, he worked every day that work was there, did he 
not? 
A. The most of them, yes, sir. We worked from half time 
on to a little less. 
Q. In some months, February and March, 1932, you didn't 
put in but two or three days a week, did you? 
A. Yes, sir; two or three days a week to less and dropped 
to nothing. Some months was nothing. He made most of 
· them, but some fe'v days he lost. 
page 34 ~ Q. Mr. Wood said he made about 4/5ths of his 
. time ; that is, in the last period of his employment; 
is that right T 
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.A. Somewhere in that neighborhood; yes, sir. 
Witness stands aside. 
DR. A. L. WILSON, 
Sworn for Plaintiff. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. You are Doctor A. L. Wilson and a practicing physician 
in the city of Lynchburg, Virginia, I believe, are you not f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you practiced medicine in the city of 
Lynchburg? 
A. For 32 years. 
Q. Do you know Wladyslave L. Krupel? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
·Q. Did you have occasion to treat him professionally? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Tell the Court and jury when you first began to treat 
him; what his trouble was then and this whole story¥ 
A. I did not know· Krupel at all and had never 
page 35 ~ done any practice for him until one day in 1930 
he came into my office and he showed signs then 
of grippe, or as we ooll it, influenza. It was in the winter 
and I treated Mr. l{rupel at that time-he had aching all 
over and g·eneral symptoms of grippe. And he sent for 
me to come to his house the next day and I found he had 
developed pneumonia and he was a very desperately ill man 
for two or three weeks at that time. After that he came to 
my office several times for his cough and bronchitis and I 
treated him for that. That went along for another year, 
and I had the date-it _was (producing papers}-on April 
22nd, 1931, he sent for me· to come to his house again and 
I went there and found Mr. Krupel with another attack of 
pneumonia, very severe-had nurses with him day and night 
-and he was siCk that time from the 22nd of April until thA 
16th of May, when we discharged him, and· during that time 
there was a severe cough and expectoration; and this cough 
did not clear up and he continued to have the bronchitis and 
continual coughing. He came to my office at different times· 
-in February, November and May, showing no improvement 
in his condition-bronchitis-and after that I rather lost 
sight of it. ·He came into the office off and on, but I think 
he went n»-Q.er treatment with Doctor Hundley and Doctor 
Young~r .after that time. That is the history of Mr. Kru-
pel's .case as I have it. There was no clearing up of the 
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lungs that you would naturally expect in a nor-
page 36 ~ mal person. 
Q. Did you make any inquiry or investigation 
as to the cause that kept his lungs from clearing up? 
A. Yes, sir; I asked him his occupation and he said he 
was working on an emery wheel at the Foundry; and I sug-
gested to him then that that was perhaps the cause of the 
continual irritation of his lungs. 
Q. Doctor Wilson, could you state whether or not, frorn 
your observation of the man-what you learned from him re 
garding his physical condition and occupation, could you say 
whether or not, on or just before April 1st, 1932, he was able 
to do work. 
A. If Krupel had been able to do mental work, instead 
of manual work, I would say •' Yes, he could have''; but I 
don't think J\1:r. Krupel was able to do manual work at that 
time. 
Q. You state in your estimation, or opinion rather, that 
on and just before April 1st, 1932, he was physically unable 
to do manual work 1 · 
A. Yes, sir; the man was very short winded and he was 
weak--continual coughing and weakness and shortness of 
breath. 
Q.. You say he was totally and permanently disabled! 
A. I think so. 
By 1vir. Williams: We object to that and move to strike 
it from the record, because it is a conclusion of la'v from the 
facts. 
By the Court: Your objection is not that the question is 
leading? 
By J\fr. Williams: It is an objection-may I say this: His 
question before tha.t was entirely proper-as to 
pag·e 37 ~ whether or not he could do a days work, but he 
is invading the province of the jury when he asks 
this witness to speak professionally and draw a conclusion in 
answering a question upon which the whole suit turns, couch-
ing it in the language of the policy itself. It is a conclusion 
for the jury. He can express an opinion as to the disability 
-its extent and the duration of the trouble and extent of it, 
but to ask him categorically, in the words of the policy, is ob-
jectionable and we object to it. 
By the Court: The witness can express his opinion, to be 
weighed by the jury, and subject to your right of cross ex-
amination to make clear what is the basis for the opinion. 
I don't think the jury is bound to accept it; to that extent 
·it is a que~tion for the jury to make ·UP its mind on. The 
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jury is not bound to accept the opinion of the witness. I 
'vill have to overrule the objection. · 
Defendant excepts to ruling of the Court for reasons stated. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. Do you think this man was permanently and totally 
disabled from doing physical and manual work or not Y 
By the ·Court: It is proper. 
Defendant excepts for reasons stated. 
A. I think he was, yes, sir; on account of his continual 
bronchitis and shortness of breath, I think he was 
pag·e 38 ~ unable to do manual work, and that was the only 
kind of work he could do. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. What do you attribute that shortness of breath and 
coughing to, from what you kno'v of this caseY 
A. I attribute it in the main to the pneumonia, which na-
turally left his lung in bad condition, and I attribute it also 
to what you call emphysema of the lungs, which means a 
portion of the lungs was not acting as they should act. That 
was the reason I attributed for his inability to work and all 
that. Do you want to go back to the cause of it? 
Q. Yes,. sir. · 
A. Of course, I thought perhaps his occupation had some-
thing to do with. it. · 
· By the Court : Is the recovery in this case dependent on 
whether or not the disability began during his· employment 
or in the course of his employment and g·rowing out of the 
employment? 
By Mr. Williams: It is the time we are interested in. 
B·y the Court: What is the materality of asking what 
caused itf 
By Mr. Jordan: We withdraw it. 
By the Court: I am not objecting to it. 
By }fr. Williams : The policy says as the result of bodily 
injury or disease. ' 
page 39 ~ By the Court: It does not say "caused by his 
employment'' Y ' 
By Mr. Jordan: No, sir. · 
By the Court: The question is whether 9r not he became 
totally and permanently disabled during the time he was 
employed, regardless of the cause of it .. 
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By Mr. Jordan: Yes, sir; while the insurance was in- exi$t-
ence. The insurance continued for about two weeks after he 
left the employment of the company. 
By the Court: Doesn't it confuse the issue as to what 
caused the disability. The question is two fold-the extent 
of the disability and when it began. 
· By Mr. Jordan: That is true. · 
By Mr. Williams: Permanence and totality. · 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. I understood yon to say, Dootor Wilson, that that con-
dition existed prior to April 1st, 1932! 
A. Yes, sir; I treated him in 1931 for pneumonia. 
CROSS E·XA.MINATION. 
By ~Ir. Williams: Without waiving my previous objec-
tions and exceptions to questions asked and answers and rul-
ings there~n, I will proceed to cross examine the witness. 
"Q. I believe you said that, in your opinion, on April 1st, 
1932, the plaintiff here was totally and permanently ·dis-
abled? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. From doing physical work Y 
A. Yes, sir,; manual work. 
page 40 ~ Q. That was based upon your observation of 
the man and his symptoms and history of the 
case, was it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As you saw them thent 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That was your prognosis, in other words, wasn't it-
your guess as to what the future held for him 7 
A. Yes, sir; we a ways have to make a prognosis. 
- Q. An answer to the question did involv:e a prognosis, did 
it notY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Would that not be subject to change, in view of the 
man's changing physical condition and under circumstances 
that demonstrated his ability to work? 
A. Of course. 
Witness stands aside. ! I • ; 
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DR. E. F. YOUNGER, 
Sworn for plaintiff. 
DIRECT EXAJMIN.ATION. 
By 1\tfr. Jordan : 
Q. You are Doctor E. F. ·younger, a practicing physician 
in the city of Lynchburg, Virginia, are you not? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been practicing in the city of Lynch-
burg, Virginia? 
A. S'ince 1908. 
page 41 ~ · Q. Are you acquainted with Wladyslave Kru-
. pel, the plaintiff in this case 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you ever treat him professionally? 
A. 1res, sir. . 
Q. Tell the Court and jury when you treated him and what 
you treated him for, and what you diagnosed his trouble to 
be,· and so forth? 
A. My first contact with Mr. J{rupel was in consultation 
with Doctor A. L. Wilson; in April, 1931. He was then suf-
fering from acute pneumonia. Doctor Wilson was going out 
of town and I saw him several times in that connection. l\Iv 
next contact with Mr. Krupel was in December, 1932. ·I 
treated him from that time through well into January. Mr. 
J{rupel is now, and has been for some time, suffering fron1 
what we may easily understand as an occupational fibrosis 
due to inhalation of fine dust particles into his lung tissues, 
creating a condition in which there is a great deal of cou~h­
ing and a great deal of expectoration or spitting up ugly 
looking material incident to the irritation of the small bron-
chioles and the small cells. · These cells are irritated to such 
an· extent that they finally become thrown off, and the cells 
that usttal cause you to exchange your oxygen that you get 
from inhaling air for carbon~dioxide-that is the waste .part 
of the body-have been replaced in this man by what we call 
fibrous tissue. That seems to be nature's way of 
page 42 ~replacing any part of the tissue that is destroyed. 
· Incidentally he has a great deal of emphysema. 
Mr.· I{rupel is permanently injured and has been for several 
years, w_hen I last saw him. At times he will. be able to work, 
that is, if the elments are in his fav:or. In the summer time, 
when he is not as subject to colds, there are times when he 
could get up and force himself to work. However, he has 
not been able to work for quite a while, and he never will be 
able to do permanent work. At times he can do what you call 
"piddling around". He is not bed-fast .. 
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. Q. Probably if weather conditions are favorable, he could 
force himself to work; Would that be injurious to his health 
or not~ 
A. His resistance is very poor and he could only work for 
a certain length of time. lt is because his resistance is not 
good. Any germ will light up the old bronchitis, so to speak. 
Q. If he were to force himself to work, would he be able 
to do that-be able to continue to do that for any length of 
time? 
.A. No, sir; no, sir; he would have to have a long period 
of rest in connection with his period of work. 
Q. Do you happen to know what Mr. Krupel 's capacity is 
for work-as to whether or not he is able to do any mental 
or clerical work, or whether or not it is all manual labor? 
A. I would say it would have to be manual la-
page 43 ~ bor. I never had occasion to test his mental ca-
. pacities, but, judging from observation, I would 
say manual work. . 
Q. Did you take a history of his case-that is of his occu-
pation, etc., when he was under your care7 
.A.. Yes, sir; it is all clear in my mind, however. 
Q. I did not mean to say that you made a record of the 
history. You made inquiries regarding his occupation, and so 
forth, did you 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You may have answered this question, but to be sure, 
I want to ask it again: 'Vhat did he tell you, as part of the 
history of his case, was his occupation? 
A. Using an emery wheel grinding something-I don't know 
'vhat. He used technical terms, but he used the emery wheel. 
Q. Did he tell you over what period of time he had been 
··doing this? 
A. He had been at this for some years-I would say for 
10 or 12 years. It is a n1atter of absorbing-you don't ab-
sorb solid matter-you deposit solid matter and absorb 
liquids. 
Q. Judging from the histo~y of the case as presented to 
you-what you observed of the man himself; could you say 
whether or not, on and before April 1st, 1932, his condition 
was or was not one of permanent and total disability f 
By ~Ir. Williams: We make the same objection heretofore 
made. 
Objection overruled. 
Defendant excepts to the ruling of the Court for reason 
stated. . .. 
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page 44 r A. I would say his condition of disability cer-
tainly has existed since I first saw him in 1931--
. April-the 1st day of April-and I saw him following that 
time I saw him with Dr. Wilson. 
By the Court : 
Q. What was that Y 
A. He 'vas totally disabled then. He could get about fol-
lowing these periods of rest-he could work for short pe-
riods, but he was totally and permanently disabled at that 
time. I understand total disability, not as a man lying on 
his back and unable to get out of bed, but I mean unable 
to do any work but what will be injurious to him. 
By Mr. Williams: I object to that. I reiterate my ob-
jection. He has defined it as to its effect on the patient. I 
objoot to that. 
By the Court: All of it goes to the jury. His opini.on as 
to total and permanent disability as defined by the policy 
does not bind the jury. But he is giving his opinion as to 
what total and permanent disability is according to what he 
understands by total and pern1anent disability. 
By 1\tir. Williams: 1t is the elasticity of the yardstick that 
different people measure it by. 
By the Court: The jury will measure it by the policy in 
the light of the evidence tl1at is introduced. 
Defendant excepts for reasons stated. · 
page 45 ~ By 1\Ir. Jordan: 
· Q. Is it your opinion or not that his physical 
condition will ever inlprove 0/ 
A. No, sir; that is a permanent condition. 
CROSS EXA~IINATION. 
By 1\fr. Williams: Without waiving objections heretofore 
made, I will ask the witness these questions: 
Q. Your prognosis of this man's cas'e is based on your 
medical experience as applied to the condition of the patient 
and· the history of the case, as you saw them at that time f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Your prog-nosis is, of course, subject to modification by 
actual demonstration of the man's own ability to work, isn't 
HI · 
A. I would like to answer that with a slang expression-· 
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''I would have to be shown" ; I would hav:e to be shown that 
the man could work, before I would believe it. 
Q. If you could be shown, of course, your prognosis is 
subject to change? 
A. I would have to know that he had worked for a good 
long period of time. 
Witness stands aside. 
page 46 ~ DR. JOHN HUN.DL~EY, 
Sworn for Plaintiff. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
I ~ 
By Mr. Jordan: · 
Q .. You are Doctor John Hundley and a practicing physi-
cian in this city, are you not 1 · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been practicing your profession in 
this city? 
· A. Probably over two years. · 
Q. Do you know 1\fr. Wladysl~ve Krupel, the plai~t.iff ,in 
this case? · - · · · .. 
A. Yes, sir; he has been coming to my office for some-
thing over two years. . 
Q. Please tell the Court ~nd jury what you were treat-
ing him for, and 'vhat you learned of his case-that is, the 
history of it that you took, etc. f 
A. I was first asked to see him in December or J anu~ry, 
. I ·don't remember which, of 1932 or 1933. I went to ·his 
home at that time and he was breathing with difficulty and 
coughing a great deal and expectorating a large amount of 
fluid. His chest was definitely involved; there was dimin-
ished respiration and what we call rales or mucous bubbles 
throughout his chest. I had him to come to be X-rayed and 
the X-ray showed :fibrosis·throughout both lungs. The.areas 
into the alveolae of terminals of the bronchial tubes were 
blocked. Dilated alveolae and areas were in the X-ray and 
it looked like it might be small minute abscesses. 
page 47 ~ I treated him for several months with light treat-
ment and gave him a cough treatment and ex-
pectorant, without definite improvement 'vhatsoever. 
Q. Without de:ffuite improvement? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In taking a history of the case, did you learn anything 
about his .previous occupation? · · - · . -
A. He gave a history of working at the Foundry grindjng 
pipe with an emery wheel and that he had gotten-that ·his 
4S Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
cough had dev:eloped during his occupation and his co~di­
tion had become almost-he had gotten almost to the pomt, 
when he was cut off,· that he was almost unable to work, and 
since then entirely so-unable to carry on any occupation. 
Q. From what you know of the history of the case and 
your. obs-ervation of the man, could you tell us when his con-
dition of disability began? 
A. With the pneumonoconiosis when dust enters the lungs, 
it develops over a period of years. No acute infection would 
cause such a thing, and it results from long-standing inhala-
tion of dust, in a dust-laden atmosphere, and the history 
must extend back over a period of four or fiv:e years. 
Q. Are ·you able, from what you know of the case to say 
whether or not this period of disability began prior to Apr1L 
1st, 19327 · 
A. I would say, definitely, that the condition that caused 
his disability began prior to that time. 
Q. A man in this condition, would you ~ay 
page 48 ~ whether· or not-please tell us what, in· your opin-
ion, is his condition as to permanent and total 
disability? · 
By Mr. Williams: We make the same objections hereto-
fore made. 
Objection overrued. 
Defendant excepts to the ruling of the Cou1·t for reasons 
stated previously. 
A. The man is definitely disabled from work. He can do 
small light work that does not require much effort. How-
ever, such a condition is always progressive. There is a 
break-down in the alveolae which produces a fibrosis that 
prevents the lung from expanding and contracting and his 
air spaces are limited and as time goes on he will be unable 
to perform the minor physical acthTities that he can now. 
Q. In other words, when you state that it is progressive, 
you mean it will grow worse and worse? 
A. Yes, sir; it will gradually get worse. 
Q. Is it injurious or not for him to do any strenuous 
physical work nowY 
A. Theoretically a damaged lung, being required to unduly 
expand through efforts to increase his respiratory r.eeds, 
would increase his damages and increase it more rapidly. 
Q. Could you .say whether or not a man in his condition 
shQuld subject himself to any sustained physical effort over 
a . pe;riod of days T 
A. I ~.n definitely say that he should not. 
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Q.. You can definitely say that he should not Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 49 }- CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Williams : 
Q. In such a case, nature would assert her own limitations; 
isn't that right? . 
A. Yes, sir, but nature's limitations are a warning and 
should be taken. 
Q. You said, Doctor, that a condition of this kind is 
gradual? 
A. It is gradual; slow in developing-progressive. 
Q. In order to say when a man, afflicted with such a (!On-
dition, could at any given time accomplish a given task, you 
would necessarily have to know, with some exactness, the 
man's condition at a given time and the energy necessary to 
be put out to accomplish a giv:en task, wouldn't you Y 
A. That is quite true. The rnost apt comparison yon could 
give for .this sort of a case, would be a man with a heart 
condition. It is possible for a man with a bad heart to do a 
-certain amount of work, which he might get by with. On 
the contrary, it is almost inevitable that it will have to be 
paid for later. . 
Q. Yes, sir; it is incumbent upon a man to operate with a 
fair margin of safety? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In atte:tnpting to go back and say that at a given time, 
at which you didn't see the patient, and a.t a time 'vhen you 
did not know the extent of the energy required to perforn1 
a given task, it is almost equivalent to hazarding a guess 
to say whether or not that man, under unknown 
page 50 }- condi~ions, could perform an unknown taskY Is 
that trne? 
A. Certainly. It would be impossible for me to say that 
he could not work at the time before I saw him, but I can 
say that the condition he is suffering with now was exist1ng 
at that time and in the process of developing. 
Q. It does not follow that the cause of the trouble had 
manifested itself so generally as it did no the occasion of 
your first examination 1 
A. That is true. 
Witness stands aside. 
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STIPULA'riON. . 
Copy of the policy, with the attached riders, it is agreed 
by counsel for both sides, to be in evidence. 
By the Court: Gentlemen, didn't you all introduce the 
policies in this case ? · 
By Mr. Jordan: We are talking about that now. We have 
agreed that the-master policy shall be introduced. By agree-
ment with Mr. Williams, .he is allowing photostatic ·copy of 
the original certificate issued to this man to be introduced. 
It was $1,000.00, but Mr. Willian1s agrees that it was in~ 
creased to $2,000.00 by a rider. This is a copy 
page 51 r (indicating) of the certificate issued to the man 
. and the original is held by the Foundry Company: 
By Mr. Williams: It is equivalent to a specimen of it. 
Change the date. It was sometime in 1925. 
By ~fr. Jordan: Yes, sir; October, 1925. 
By Mr. Williams: Is that GLI-76°/ 
By Mr. Wood: Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Williams·: We will concede that it was increased 
to $1,000.00. 
By Mr. Jordan: It is agreed that such a one was issued 
and increased to $2,ooq.oo. 
Plaintiff rests. 
page 52 r EVIDENCE FOR DEFENDANT. 
R. B. CALDWELL, 
Sworn for D·efendant. 
DIRECT EXAlVIINATION. 
By Mr. Williams : 
Q. Where were you employed in 1\f.ay, 1931? 
A. In May, 1931? 
Q. Yes, sir. 
A. I was with Mr. Decker, on Fort Ifill construction work. 
Q. For whom? 
A. I was under Mr. Decker. and Mr. Coffey. 
Q. Were you working for the City of Lynchburg, Va.? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was your position? 
A. Laborer. 
Q. Did you subsequently-that 'vas your position at the 
time, was it? 
A. Yes, sir .. 
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Q. Did you subsequently have a change of position with 
the City? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you ever become a foreman 7 
A. Not until June ·27th. 
Q. What year? 
A. In 1922. 
Q. You mean 1932, don't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 53 ~ Q. That was the stunmer of 1932, then Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know Mr .. Krupel, the plaintiff in this caseY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he work under you that summer 7 . 
A. Beginning June 27th and working through October 12th. 
Q. Do you have a record of the number of hours which 
men working under you made at that time Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Produce that, if you have it with you Y 
A. (Witness produces record requested.) 
Q. State whether or not the book you hold in your hand 
is the original time book you yourself made, showing tho 
time that various employees worked during the period cov-
ered by that book? 
A. Yes, sir, absolutely. 
Q. Refer to that record and state when Mr. Krupel went 
to work-what date? 
A. (Examines book.) Mr. Krupel started to work under 
my foremanship June 27th, 1932. . 
Q .. How many hours did he put in that day? 
A. Ten hours on the 27th; it was Monday. 
Q. What was his rate of pay? 
A. Ten cents ali hour. 
Q. Read from your record, now, day by day, showing the 
number of hours he worked for you on that job-start read-
ing where you have your finger (indicating), and read it day 
by dav, showing the number of hours he put in Y 
page 54} A. We changed jobs. We were not on the same 
job all the time. 
Q. Well, whatever· job you did there. 
A. On the 28th, he wqrked two hours. 
Q. How long did the other men work that day? 
A. Two hours. On the 29th, ten hours. On the 30th, ten 
hours, and the others ten hours. July 1st, ten hours and the 
others ten hours. On July 2nd, five hours, wliich was .Sat-
urday. We worked only a half a day. The 3rd was Sunday. 
Monday the 4th, ten hours. : Tuesday the 5th, ten hours. 
Wednesday the 6th, ten hours. On Tuesday the 7th, ten hours 
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-I mean Thursday. Dn Friday, ten hours. On Saturday, 
·five hours. Sunday the lOth is out. On Monday, he was 
absent. . The others made ten hours. On Tuesday he was 
out and the others made ten hours. On Wednesday he was 
out and the others made ten hours. On the 14th, they changed 
the rate of pay, which was from ten cents an hour to 25c per 
hour. 
Q. What was the occasion of that Y 
A. We went to the asphalt plant and began concrete work. 
Q .. What work 'vas he doing in connection with the job-
in what capacity was he working? 
A. Anything· that would come to hand, such as shoveling 
rock and wheel-harrowing· rock to the concrete mixer. 
Q. That was the 14th of July? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How much time did he work that day? 
A. Nine hours on the 14th and the others made nine hours. 
Some of the men made four hours and some ten 
page 55 ~ hours. I cannot recall exactly but t think we had 
a lot of cement to unload that day and Mr. Krupel 
happened to be one those we chose to stay to help unload the 
cement. 
Q. Why did you choose him? 
· A. I could not say; all of us have friends we would like 
to do all we can for and he happens to be one of them and I 
wanted to do my best to help him. 
Q. Some of the others g·ot only four hours? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That was the 15th of July, was it f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q .. Now, the 16th Y 
A. On the 16th he made fiv,e hours, which was on a Sat-
urday. Most of the men were out. and he happened to be 
the one chosen that came back, and I don't recall whether 
we had cement to unload, but it was something to unload, 
such as gravel, sand or cement, and he happened to be amoug 
the chosen ones. 
Q. That was July 16th. All right, proceed. 
A. Sunday was the 11th. 
Q. Was it the 11th or 17th? 
A. The 17th; and Monday was the 18th, he worked ten 
hours; and Tuesday the 19th, he worked ten hours; the 20th 
he worked 10 hours; the 21st, ten hours; on the 22nd. ten hours 
and on the 23rd, five hours, which was Saturday. · On ~Ion­
day the 25th, he 'vorked ten hours and Tuesday the 26th, 
ten hours and the 27th, he worked six hours. 
page 56 ~ 'Q. How long did the others work that da.v~ 
A. Six hours. On the 28th, Thursday, he \vorked 
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ten hours; on Friday, the 29th, ten hours, and on Saturday 
the 30th, he worked five hours. The rest of the men also 
made five hours. On August 1st, he made 10 hours, which 
was on Monday; on Tuesday he was out; the most of the 
men were out. V.l e had a few of the older men that helped 
that day. 
Q. Older in point of service, you mean Y 
A. Yes, sir. On the 3rd he was out. Some of the men 
made four hours that day and so1ne nine hours. 
Q. How do you account for that j 
A. Well, as well as I remember, we had something to un-
load and we were unloading rock, sand or cement or what-
ever it was. They were cut otT.. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. What day was that t 
A. That was the 3rd of August. 
By Mr. Williams: 
Q. That is right; now on the 4th. 
By :hlr. Jordan: 
Q. !-Ir. Krupel did not appe~r for work that day at alii 
A. No, sir. 
By Mr. Williams~ 
Q. Now on the 4th? 
A. On the 4th of August, he was absent; on the 5th he 
was absent. 
Q. How n1ueh time did the other men make that 
page 57 } day f 
A. On the 4th the other men made nine hours 
and on the 5th, nine l1ours, and 011 Saturday 110 one worked. 
Q. That was the 6th? 
A. Yes, sir. On the 8th, he made ten hours; . on the 9th 
he made ten hours ; on the lOth he made ten hours ; on the 
11th he made ten hours ; on the 12th, he made ten honrH, on 
the 13th, he made four hours ; and the other men made four 
hours that day. On the 15th, he made ten hours; on the 
16th ten hours; on the 17th he made ten hours; on the 18th 
he made seven hours-and the others n1ade seven hours too 
-on the 19th, he 1nade nine hours ; the others also made nine 
hours; and on the 20th, five hours, and the others made five 
hours also. On the 22nd, he made five hours. Some of the 
men made five hours and some six hours and some nine 
l1ours, but I would say that the majority made ·five hours that 
day. On the 23rd he made ten hours; on the 24th ten hours: 
on the 25th he made six hours ; the other -also made six ours ; 
,-
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on the 26th he made 11 hours and the others made 11 hours; 
on the 27th no one worked; on the 29th, fiv:e hours, and tl1e 
other men made five hours ; on the 30th he made ten hours, 
on the 31st he made fiv:e hours, anq the rest of the men made 
ten hours. I cannot say whether or not he happened to be 
sick that day or why he put in the fiv:e hours but notwithstand-
ing that he put in half a day. As to whether or not it was 
in the morning or evening, I cannot recall. On the 1st of 
.September, he was absent; on the 2nd he was absent; on the 
3rd, he worked five hours and the rest of the men 
page 58 } worked five hours. 
Q. On the 1st and 2nd, how much time did the 
others make 7 
A. Ten hours. On the 5th, he was absent; the other men 
made ten hours. On the 6th he made ten hours; on the 7th 
he made ten hours; on the 8th, he made 10 hours; on the 
9th, he made ten hours and on the lOth he made ·five hours ; 
and the rest of the men made five hours. On. the 12th he made 
10 hours; on the 13th he made 10 hours; on the 14th he 1nade 
10 hours; o.n the 15th ten hours; on the 16th he made ten 
hours and on the 17th he rnade fiv:e hours; the rest of the man 
also made five hours. On the 19th he was absent and tho 
rest of the men. made ten hours; on the 20th he made five 
hours and the rest of the men made fiv:e ·hours; did I say on 
the 19th he was absent? 
Q. Yes, sir, and that the rest 1nade ten hours. 
A. On the 21st, he n1ade 7 hours; the rest of the men also 
made seven hours.· On the 22nd he made five hours, and 
the rest of the men made five hours. On the 27th he made 
-I mean on the 23rd he made nine hours and the rest of 
the men made nine hours ; on the 24th he made five hours and 
some of the men made two hours and some five hours ; I 
don't recall what was the reason for that. On the 26th he 
made ten hours; on the 27th he made ten hours; on the 28th 
he was out. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. How much did the others make on the 28th f 
page 59 }- A. Didn't anyone work on the 28th. 
By Mr. Williams: 
Q. On the 28th nobody worked 7 
A.. That is right. On the 29th he made ten hours; on the 
30th he made nine hours and the rest made nine hours. 
Q. He made the same ·as the rest on the 30th? :' 
A. Yes, sir. On the 1st he was absent and the re'st were 
also absent. · : 
Q.. Nobody worJ{ed on the 1st t 
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· A. No, sir. 
Q. The 1st of Octoberi 
A. Yes, sir. On the 3rd, he worked ten hours; on the 4th 
he worked ten hours and on the 5th he was absent-the ma-
jority of the men were absent. 
By Mr. Jordan: 
Q. Did any of them work? 
A. Some of them worked, but they didn't in his depart-
ment. I carried some of the higher men, such as the fireman 
at the shovel and the concrete mixer. They got solid time 
and I had to carry my book solid time. On October 6th he 
was absent. 
Q. How much time was worked that day Y 
A. The majority of the men made fiv.e hours that day. 
On the 7th he worked ten hours and on the Sth he worked 
five hours. 
By Mr. Williams: 
Q. How much did the rest make Y 
page 60 ~ A. Five hours. On the lOth he made five hours 
and the majority made five hours. On the 11th he 
made ten hours; on the 12th he made eight hours; that is the 
last. 
Q. What did the others make that day? 
A. Eight hours. That was the last day he worked for 
me. 
Q. Octo her 11th Y 
A. October 12th. 
" Q. Mr. Cardwell, what kind of a worker was :ht[r. J{rupel 
while working 'vith you 1 · 
A. I should say he was as good as the rest, according to 
his age. 
Q. You said his work consisted of wheelbarrow and 
shovel work T 
A. Yes, sir, and pick work. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Wood: 
Q. Mr. Caldwell, you stated he started to work on June 
27th, 1932; is that correct 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you know Mr. J{rupel prior to that dater 
A. No, sir, I did not. -
Q. Do you know whether or not the City had been feeding 
him up to that timeT 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. Yo~..didn't know that the city got him for relief. You-
. didn't know that 7 
page 61 ~ A. I knew when he came to me that he was on 
relief work, but I didn't know him prior to that 
time. 
Q. Did you know whether or not ~fr. J{rupel was a mar-
ried man or not Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you know whether or not he had any children f 
A. No, sir, not at that time. 
Q. Do you know whether or not he is a. married man 1 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. This work you started June 27th on which he made ten 
cents an hour; what kind of work was that-hauling rocks in 
a wheelbarrow Y 
A. It was right down in the street with a pick and shovel, 
. grading up the streets. 
Q. That is the work he was getting ten cents an hour for; 
who was sponsoring· that work-the city or charity or what 
was itt 
A. I should say that it 'vas the city and charity combined. 
Q. The City was taking care of these people and wanted 
something for them to do Y 
A. I don't kno'v anything about that end of it, but these 
men were sent to me by Mr. Decker to put to work, and my 
understanding was that they wer~ supposed to have been on 
charity. 
By the Court: 
Q. Who is Mr. Decker? 
By Mr. Williams: An employee of the city. 
page 62 ~By Mr. Wood: 
· Q. These men were sent to you by Mr. Decker 
and your understanding was that the city had been feeding 
them and wanted to give them some money? · 
A. That is my understanding. 
Q. And their pay was ten cents an hour? 
}!... Yes, sir. 
. Q. And he continued on that work to what date-he 
changed when he went to the asphalt plant 7 . 
A. July 14th, I believe. · 
Q. He worked from June 27th to July 14th, at ten cents 
an hour? 
. A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Was that work as hard as the 'vork he did after J ulv 
14th? ¥ 
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A. I could not say there was any difference in it; just 
about equal. 
Q. No difference in the amount of manual work. During 
this time, say from June 27th to July 14th, I believe, accord-
ing to your staten1ent, he lost some time during that period. 
He was off¥ 
A. I think he lost some time in there. 
Q. Did you observe this man very closely 1 
A. No, sir, no more so than the others. 
Q. While he was under your observation or supervision, 
did you ever have occasion to send him home? Did he pass 
out on the job and have to be sent home in a carT 
page 63 r A. Vv e were \VOrking on the Accomac grading--
grading the street-after we left the asphalt plant 
and we got on this concrete work and we were sent out to 
help grade and :Nir. 1\:rupel was taken sick on the job, but 
my book does not show that he was docked for that time. 
Q. I am not asking· you that. State whether or not you 
gave him credit for a full day's. time, whether or not he 
worked1 
A. Yes, sir; that is the way we did good honest men. 
Q. Some days you reported him. working a full day, but 
if he was taken sick during the day, he got credit for a full 
day's work! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You considered him an l1onest man and trying to do 
to the best of his ability f 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Didn't yon on several occasions, on three or four oc-
easions, more or less, didn't you all send 1\Ir. I{rupel home 
because he was taken siek on the job 1 
A. I could not say; it has been so long back I cannot re-
call. 
Q. You don't recall about that t 
A. I would not say that for a true statement, because 
I cannot ·recall. 
Q. You don't recall sending him ho1ne at all ·f 
A. No, sir. 
Q,. Not at all 7 
A. No, sir. 
page 64} Q. Didn't yo11 just make the statement that you 
sent him home from the job on Accomac? 
A. I said probably we sent him l1ome, but I said my· book 
does not show that we docked hin1 for the tin1e, but I know 
he got sick on several days on Accomac. 
Q. You know he was sick on several days on the job on 
Accomacf 
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A. Yes, but I could not say whether or not we sent him 
home. 
Q. Was that in July, August or September on 1\ccOinac? 
A. It was sometime after the 14th of July; sometime after 
that because-
. Q. (Interrupting:) He was sick three or four days after 
the 14th of July? 
A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. What was the nature of the Accomac job; what was the 
nature of his work there? 
A. Grading-pick and shovel. 
Q. When he was sick, did you go up and observe him-did 
you see himY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What seemed to be his trouble? 
A. I asked him what was his trouble and he said ''Just giv-
ing out"; that he had something ''like the thumps"; and I 
told him to go to the bushes and sit awhile and if he felt 
like coming back, to come back; but I did not inquire whether 
he laid out the rest of the day. That happened 
page 65 ~ on several occasions-more than once, I know--
but I don't know whether we carried him home or 
not. 
Q. He complained of trouble up here (indicating), did 
heY 
A. I know he lost several days after that for being sick. 
Q. After Snly 14th? . 
A. Yes, sir; after he was taken sick on Accomac. He lost 
several days. 
Q. Is that the only occasion he was act·ual taken sick on 
the job? After that Accomac job was he taken sick another 
time? 
A. It seems to me that I remember at the plant-that :was 
some time in the latter part of September, that he began to 
give way. 
Q. In September he began to give way again, did heY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did he complain of· at that time? 
A. I cannot recall. 
Q. Did any of the other employees working with him ever 
complain about 'vorking with this fellow and drinking after 
him? 
A. Yes, sir, absolutely. 
Q. What were their statements-why did they complain 
of drinking after him Y · 
A. They said they did not like to drink after a man that 
was coug·hing and hawking and spitting around 
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page 66 ~ Q. Did you observe that he coughed right much 
on the job! 
A. Absolutely, ·from the beginning, yes, sir. 
Q. The men's reactions were that they did not like to drink 
after him~ · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Why did they say they did not ~ike to drink after hintT 
A. Well, I didn't hear them say, but I can just. imagine. 
Q. Did they think he had "TB"Y 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did they ever make any statements like that to you t 
A. I don't remen1ber their statements. 
Q. What did you do to satisfy the other employees about 
drinking after him t · 
A. We had a hydrant pretty close to the plant, and, in-
stead of bringing water in buckets to the men, he would go 
back and forth to the hydrant himself. 
Q. You made a drinking fountain at the hydrant? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q.. Do you remember another time after September that 
he took sick on the job Y ·. 
A. I cannot .recall no more than he began to give way 
along about the latter part of Septem.ber-he began to fall 
off and got raw-boned, and tha.t is all I remember. 
Q. Wliat part of S'eptember did you notice that7 
A. I could not say. 
page 67 ~ Q. The first of September 7 
latter part. 
A. No; I think it was later than that; about the 
Q. The middle of September Y 
A. The latter part. . 
Q. You did yourself personally notice that he looked weak 
and had fallen off? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He didn't have his usual amount of pep, did heY He 
was a hard worker and tried to do his duty. You observed 
that, did you not? 
A. That is true. 
Q. Do you remember when he was off in July? You said 
on direct examination that he lost July 11th, 12th and 13th. 
That the other ·men worked ten hours. Do you know why he 
was off then 1 
A. No, sir. 
· Q. Nobody ever went to see him at his home, did they! 
A .. I do kno'v that the hours that he lost-I am confident 
they were on account of his not being able to get to w·ork. 
_ Q. You are confident that it was on account of his not being 
physically able to come to work? 
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. A.·: Yes, sir. because my men, as a usual thing, report to 
me wliether or not they have to attend to business or whether 
or not they are· sick, and I don't recall whether or not he . 
was-but he would bring a message to me the next morning 
and whether-when he returned to ·work, whether or not he 
was siclt. 
page .68 ~ Q. ·You don't remember whether or not he told 
you what was the matter with him or notT 
A. No, sir. 
Q. On October 12th, that is the last day he worked-have 
you seen him since that date? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Does-he look worse now or better than he did then? 
A. I cannot see any difference in him-the last day I seen 
him up until today. 
Q. You do remember that he. complained of hi~ cough-
ing and that the other men complained of it~ ,/ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Your book that you referred to there, is that the same 
book Mr. Decker has~ 
.A. No; sir, that is mine. 
Q. Did he keep the same records you kept Y 
A. I made off daily reports and sent them to him and he 
would check it on his book, don't you see. His book should 
tally with mine. 
Q. It is made up from the records you sent him Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He didn't keep a record of the men working himself, 
did he? . 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He didn't come out on the job, did he? 
.A. No, sir. 
Q. You did that and gave the record to him? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 69 ~ Q. Mr. Decke.r came by the job occasionally, did 
heY 
.A. Every day. 
Q. He came out and observed the men¥ 
·A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIR.E:CT EXAI\1INATION. 
By ~fr. Williams : 
Q. You spoke of l{rupel 's being observed leaving the job 
on several occasions. Are you able to state how many? 
.A. No, sir . 
. Q. Was it as many as five? 
A. I don't think so. ; I 
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Q. About how many, as nearly as you can recall? 
A. I know it was more than once, and probably twice, on 
Accomac. I could not say we carried him hon1e, but he got 
out and had to go to the bushes, as we call it. Now, as I 
said awhile ago, my book does not show he 'vas docked. If 
he was ~arried hon1e, I don't remember, and if he was car-
ried home, he got a full day for it. 
Q. All yo'u remember is two occasions 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And no more? 
A. I cannot recall. 
·Q. You ~annot recall any more. 'Vhat was the conditiou 
of the weather there while you were working on Accomac T 
A. It was very, very hot. . 
Q. vVhat effect did that have on the men working there 0/ 
A. Vv ell, one or two men got out. I would not say they 
suffered in the way 1\Ir. J{rupel did. 
Witness stands aside. 
})age 70} STIPULATION. 
It is agreed between ~ounsel on both sides that the in-
surance policy upon which this suit was brought was can-
celled April 1st, 1932. 
Defendant rests. 
REBUTTAL E,OR THE PLAINTIFF. 
T. T. DECI{ER, 
Sworn in rebuttal for plaintiff. 
DIRECT EXAJ\IINATION. 
By 1\fr. Jordan~ 
Q. You are employed by the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, 
are you¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been . so employed? 
A. For thirteen years . 
. Q. What is your employment? 
A. I am superintendent of construction. 
Q. Are you acquainted with Mr. Krnpel, the plaintiff in 
this caseY 
A. Yes, sir; for the last year or so. 
Q. It has been testified here by Mr. Caldwe1l, 
~-
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page 71 ~ who I believe works under you, that Mr. Krupel 
came to work for the city June 27, 1932¥ 
A. Something like that, yes, sir. 
Q. Tell us how he happened to come to the city for eni-
ploymentT · 
A. He was one of the relief workers of the city of Lynch-
burg or I think on Thon1as &ad at one time. 
Q. He has done what is kno\vn as relief work Who sent 
him to you? · 
A. The Associated Charities. 
Q. The Associated Charities of the city of Lynchburg 7 
A. Yes, sir; they would send a man to be put to work on 
the relief job and they were paid at that time ten cents an 
hour. 
Q.. It was charity or some charity project Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAl\fiN ... '\.TION. 
By Mr. Williams : 
Q. He didn't keep on being· a relief worker, did he? 
A. No, sir; later on that relief was cut down, as we opened 
up our works. 
Q. What did you do with him? 
A. 'Ve transferred him to get hhn a regular jo~­
Q. He became a regular worker; did he! 
A. Yes, sir; a 1nonth after that. The foreman on the job 
came back to take his regular job. 
page 72 ~ Q. Mr. Caldwell said that was on July 14th that 
he took hhn to the asphalt plant? 
A. Something like that. 
Q. When he took him to the asphalt plant, he got a regular 
job, did he? 
A. Yes, sir; on the regular city payroll. 
Q .. That 'vas because he was a good 'vorker? 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT E·XAl\1INATION. 
Bv Mr. Jordan: 
: .. Q. A~ I understand you, did you or not stay right on the 
job where these men were working·? . 
A. No, sir, not all the time. I had several jobs. 
Q. Mr. Krupel was working immediately under Mr. Cald-
well, was he not? 
A. Immediately under him, yes, sir. 
Q. And not directly under you all the time! 
A. No, sir. 
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Witness stands aside. 
Both sides rest. 
End of all evidence. 
pag~ 73 } EXCEPTIONS TO INSTRUCTIONS. 
By ~[r. Jordan: We object to instruction" A" offered by 
defendant. The latter part of it says ''when he was unable 
to engage in any work or occupation or perform any work 
for compensation or profit". I think the whole of the thing 
should be changed to conform to what the law is on the sub-
ject. ' 
By the Court: Do you object to the :first part of itY 
By lvfr. Jordan: Yes, sir. It says "booame permanently, 
continuously and wholly prevented front performing any work 
for compensation or profit". 
· By the Court: Is that the language of the policy Y 
By Mr. Jordan: I think so. 
By the Court: What ground of objection have you to the 
language of the policy 1 
By Mr. Jordan: My objection is this-that although-
By the Court: (Interrupting.)· Then you would follow 
that clause with a clause construing the language of the 
policy? 
By Mr. Jordan: Yes, sir. 
By the Court: .All right. You object to the second sen· 
tence as an improper construction of -the language ·of the 
policy. Is that the g·round of your objootionY 
page 74 ~ By Mr. Jordan: It properly construes the ab .. 
solute language of the policy as the policy is writ-
ten, but it does not state the law as the is construed with tho 
policy. 
By the Court: All right. Now we will take up your in-
structions. ~.fajor Williams, do you object to Instruction 
No.1. 
By ~{r. Williams: My objections to Plaintiff Instruction 
No. 1 are two fold : ·In the first place, the instruction taken 
no cognizance of April 1st, 1932. 
By the Court: You would change March 17th, 1932, to 
April 1st, 1932. 
By Mr. Williams : No, sir. You will note on a more careful 
reading, it says: ''If the jury believe that he was employed 
by the Foundry Company"-that has reference to his em-
ployment-that he was-"that while the plaintiff was so 
insured, and before his sixtieth birthday" -add there '' prio1• 
to April 1st, 1932". 
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B·y the Court: All right, I don't understand there is any 
dispute about that. . . 
By 1\tfr. Jordan: That is all r1ght. 
By Mr. Williams: It goes on "hH became totally and per-
manently disabled as a result of bodily injury suffered or 
disease contracted". The instruction should continue in t1H:~ 
language of the policy, so as to be prevented thereby from 
eng·aging in any occupation and performing any 
page 75 ~ work for wage or profit. 
By the Court: What is the objection to that~? 
By }fr. Jordan: The Courts have construed this provi-
sion of the insurance policy not to 1nean exactly what it says 
in the exact language. 
By the Court: Isn't this the difference between you gen-
tlemen : Isn't this the difference between you as to the first 
instruction: Mr. Williams says that the fact that the man 
did do some ·work, ought to be accepted as binding in law as 
an admission that he was able to do the work. 
By the Court: We will take up plaintiff's instruction #2. 
By Mr. Willian1s: lvfy first objection to Instruction #2 
for plaintiff, lies in the presentation to the jury, as an ab-
solute requirem·ent, that ''he was unable to work 
page 76 }- continuously in his usual line of employment". I 
do not think it necessary that the work which he 
does, in order to sho'v lack ·of total and permanent diH·-
ability is necessarily· continuous work, and the instruction 
is faulty because it provides "continuous" work. 
By the Court: Wouldn't that be met by simply striking 
it out. (Reading:} "Or in some other work that he would 
have been physically and menta.Ily able to do but for such 
dis a hili ty.' ' 
By Mr. Williams: That cures it. It unduly accentuates that. 
By the Court: With reasonable continuity down below, I 
think belongs in there, but I think continuously comes out 
above there. · 
By Mr. Jordan: I don't object to its coming out. 
By Mr. Williams: My next objection is that it loses sight 
of the dead line, April 1st, 1932, in the same sentence. The 
disability must exist as of April 1st, 1932. 
By 1\{r. Jordan: It is in the first instruction. 
By Mr. Williams: I want it in this one, too. 
By Mr.· Jordan: .All right. 
By the Court: .State your objection to the latter part. · 
B'y Mr. Williams: I have no objection providing notice is 
t.aken of the dead line date. I 'vould insert it in the latter 
part of the first sentence. 
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By 1\{r. Williams: I object to instruction No. 3 offered by 
plaintiff, because it unduly accenuates the expert opinion of 
the physicians thdt testified and presents the issue to the 
jury on part of the evidence. 
page 77 ~ By the Court: I think you are correct. 
By lVIr. J·ordan: Vve don't object to striking out 
''including the opinion of the physicians that testified''. 
By 1\{r. Williams: As to Instruction No. 4, offered by the 
plaintiff, that brings out the question argued on demurrer. 
By the Court: Yes, sir, I refuse that. The 1neasure of 
damages is the number of past due instalments that have 
accrued prior to the bringing of suit. 
By 1\fr. Williams: And the subsequent filing of the claim. 
The language of the policy is "upon receipt of proof, the 
company will do so and so". 
By the Court: Yes, sir, the 'Vest Virginia suit turned on. 
that. 
By 1\ir. Jordan: Yes, sir; I am familiar with the case. 
We don't dispute that; it begins after we gave notice. Their 
·liability began after we filed notice of disability. 
By the Court: Proof. 
By 1\fr. Jordan: All right, proof. We furnished all that 
on 1\{arch 3rd. · 
By the Court: Why can't we figure that out right now--
the amount you owe-on n1y theory-not your theory-is due 
from the time proof was furnished-what is it, $52.50, mul-
tiplied by the number of Inonths that were between the time 
proof was furnished and suit was brought. 
By 1\fr. Jordan: It is a very g·ood idea. We 
page 78 ~ anticipated you would refuse Instruction #4, but 
we would like to object to the Court's ruling in 
refusing it, on the ground that it does not give the correct 
n1easure of damages, on anticipatory breach of contract. It 
will also apply to the instruction you will give in its stead. 
The Court and counsel at this time calculated the amount 
of damages to be assessed, if any, and arrived at the sum of 
$397.25. 
By the Court: ~fake it ''The Court instructs the jury that. 
if they find for the plaintiff, they will assess his d~mages at 
$397.25", and strike out the rest of that instruction. 
By the Court: That disposes of the plaintiff's instructions 
~nd leaves only the defendant's instructions. Yon made an 
objection, 1\Ir. Williams. 
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By J\.Ir. Williams: In Instruction No. 1, I said you should 
"put in the whole language of the policy. 
By the Court : Total and permanent disability as the re-
sult of bodily injury suffered or disease contracted. What 
is the rest of the language of the policy~ 
By ~Ir. Williams: You will find it in my Instruction ''A''. 
"So as to be prevented thereby fron1 engaging in any occu- _ 
pation or doing any work for wage or profit. 
By Mr. Jordan : It would mislead the jury and make the 
jury believe that because he did s01ne work afterw~rds, it 
would preclude recovery. 
By the Court: What I am trying to g·et is the language 
of the policy. 
page 79 ). By l\fr. Williams : There is a difference in the 
language of the two documents composing the 
policy. 
By the Court: That con1pletes the instructions for the 
plaintiff. See how this reads·: '' A.nd if the jury believe from 
the e•ddence that since April 1, 1932, the date when the in-
surance aforesaid was cancelled, the plaintiff has been able 
to engage in any occupation or perfonn any work for com-
pensation or profit, as set out in the instructions read and 
considered as a whole, without aggravation of any disabling 
disease that he l1ad, ·or without other serious impairment 
of his health, they should find for the defendant.'' 
By l\1:r. Willian1s : I want my exceptions in the record. 
My objection is primarily, that the instruction as re-drafted 
hy the Court, inserts conditions to be considered by the jury 
which are not a part of the contract-of the policy contract; 
for example, as I recall it, he performed work and service 
without impairment to his health, etc., thereby injecting an 
element into the case that is not a portion of the policy con-
tract, and that the addition of this issue would be distinctly 
prejudicial to the defendant and increases for us the burden 
of defense in this case. 
A recess was here taken until 2 :15 P. 1\L o'clock. 
page 80} AFTERNOON SESSION, 2:15 P.l\f. O'CLOCK. 
January 19, 1934. 
By the Court: Yon object, 1\ilr. Willia.ms, to the last part 
of this instruction, Defendant's Instruction #A-1. 
By l\{r. Williams: I object to the first addition, yes, sir. 
By the Court: I think there is evidence to sustain that in 
the form it is in. 
By Mr. Williams: My objections are-that the defendant 
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is entitled to have an instruction covering his theory of the 
case, without modification. · 
By the ·Court : You would like for me to instruct the jury 
to construe the language of the policy literally, which I will 
not do. . 
By ~Ir. Williams: The plaintiff has his theory of the 
case, which represents one extreme and the defendant should 
.have its theory on the other extreme. I object to the inser-
tion of the word "reasonably", which is not a portion of 
the policy provision, and the addition of the words '' instruc-
tions to be read as a whole". The Court, of course, qualifies 
the policy provisions by instructions asked for by plaintiff 
by ''utter helplessness". 
page 81 r The plaintiff objects to the court's amendment 
of plaintiff's instructi<On No. 1, as originally given, 
by the addition of the words ''and wholly prevented thereby 
from performing any work for compensation or profit", on 
the ground that such addition tells the jury that the mere fact 
that the plaintiff did any work whatever after April 1st, 
1932, for which he received compensation, would preclude 
him from making a recovery, which is contrary to the law 
of Virginia and is in direct conllict with plaintiff's instruc--
tion No. 2, and Defendant's Instruction A, and that the 
said addition is therefore misleading. 
The plaintiff objects to the court's ruling in refusing to 
give plaintiff's Instruction No. 4, on the ground that it cor-
rectly states the law of Virginia regarding the measure of 
damages that the plaintiff may sue for on an anticipatory 
breach of contract. 
The plaintiff objects to the court's ruling in giving de-
fendant instruction .A-1, instead of plaintiff instruction No. 
4, on the ground that defendant's said instruction incorrectly 
limits the an1ount of the recovery to the aggreg·a te of the in-
stalments due according to the policy of insurance from the 
time proof of disability was filed, to-wit, March 3rd, 1932, 
to the time of the institution of this action, to-wit, Octoher 
20th, 1933, when, according to the plaintiff's contention, the 
plaintiff should be allowed to recover the entire damages for 
the -breach of the whole contract extending over a period of 
forty months at $52.50 per month. 
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page-~~~ IN COURT. (In presence of jury.) 
The Court gave the following oral instruction to the jury: 
By the Court: Gentlemen of the jury, the claim asserted 
under this insurance policy is what is CODlmOnly called "to-
tal disability". I do not use the exact language of the policy; 
that is the general idea. Perntanent and total disability must 
occur before any liability may attach and that permanent 
and total disability must begin before the policy in this case 
'vas cancelled. That is, not that the cause may have begun 
before the policy was cancelled, but that the total and per-
manent disability itself must have begun before the policy 
was cancelled. Now, in this case, there are only two ques-
tions to decide or maybe oRe. First determine whether or 
not this man became totally and pern1anenty disabled with-
in the meaning of the language that was used in this policy. 
Under the law as to these policies, their language is not to 
be literally construed. It does not mean for example that a 
policy on a man that makes his living by manual labor-
that he must be rendered absolutely helpless. Most any 
n1an, whatever the extent of. his disability, could sit on the 
street corner and peddle shoe strings, and to that extent 
would be in a gainful occupation, but the Courts have held 
that the language is to be reasonably construed to carry out 
what was the intention of the parties when it was 
page 83 ~ made. If you determine that ~:Ir. l{rupel did not 
become permanently and totally disabled within 
the meaning of the policy as construed by the Court, that is 
the end of your duties. You simply say that we, the jury, 
find for the defendant. If, on the other hand, you detern1ine 
that he did become totally and permanently disabled within 
the meaning· of the policy as construed by the Court, you next 
determine whether or not that total and permanent disability 
set in before the policy was cancelled on April 1, 1932. lf 
you determine both of these questions in favor of the plain-
tiff, we have made the calculation for you, so that you will 
have the simple entry to make: ''We, the jury, find for the 
plaintiff and assess his darnages at $397.25 ", which is the 
calculation .of the amount accrued between the time he fur-
nished proof as required by the policy and the tiine he brought 
suit. If he was entitled to anything it 'vas $52.50 a month 
from the time he broug·ht suit, and that amount would come 
to $397.25. 
I will now read to you certain instruction which have been 
written, as follows : 
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(The Court here read the written instructions to the jury, 
after "rhich the Court further instructed the jury orally, as 
follows:) 
(The written instructions follow im1nediately after this, 
beginning on page 82, and the final oral instruction follows 
the written instructions :) 
pag·e 84 ~ PLAINTIF~,,S INSTRUCTION NO. 1. 
Given as amended. Both sides except. 
The Court instructs the jury that, if they believe from the 
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff, J(rupel, was 
employed by the Lynchburg Foundry Company prior to 
l\1:arch 17th, 1932, and that as such employee he was insured 
in the sum of $2,000.00 under the group policy of insurance 
issued by the defendant, The 1\·fetropolitan Life Insurance 
Company, to the said foundry company for the benefit of its 
employees, and that while the plaintiff was so insured, and 
before l1is sixtieth birthday, and prior to April 1st, 1932, he 
became totally and permanently disabled as a result of bodily 
injury suffered or disease contracted, and wholly prevented 
thereby frmn perforn1ing any work for con1pensation or 
profit, then the jury will find for the plai~tiff. 
PLAINTlF1F INSTRUCTION NO. 2. 
Given. Defendant excepts. 
The Court instructs the jury that "totally and penna-
nently disabled'', as used in the said insurance policy, does 
not mean a state of utter helplessness, and the fact that the 
plaintiff, after he left the mnployment of the said foundry 
~ompany, did perforn1, or did attempt to perform, work of 
some kind, does not necessarily preclude him from a recov-
ery under the said insurance policy, provided the 
page 85 } jury believe total and per1nanent disability began 
and existed ''rhile the said insurance was in force 
prior to April 1st, 1932, and that he ''ras unable to work in 
l1is usual line of en1ployment or in some other work that he 
would have been physically and mentally able to do but for 
such disability. The Court further instructs the jury that 
"totally and permanently disabled", within the meaning or 
the said poliey of insurance, means that the insured beeame, 
and is, unable to work with reasonable continuity in his usual 
occupation or in such other occupation as he might other-
wise have been physically and mentally qualified to work in, 
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under all the circumstances, or to perform substantially all 
the reasonable and essential duties incident thereto .. 
PLAiNTIE"'F'S INSTRUCTION NU~fBER 3. 
Given. Defendant excepts. 
The Court instructs the jury that the question of whether 
the insured was totally and pennanently disabled is one 
for. the jury to decide from all the evidence submitted. 
PLAI.NTIFF INSTRUCTION NO. 4. R.EFUSED. 
Amended and given as 4-A. Both sides except. 
The Court instruct~ the jury that, if they shall find for 
the plaintiff, they will assess his damages in the 
page 86 ~ sum of $397.25, which is the amount of the policy 
payments, after proof of disability was furnished, 
and up to the time suit was :filed, to be allowed the plaintiff 
if anything he due him. 
PLAINTIFF.'S' INSTR.UCTION NO. 4-RE.FUSED. 
The ·Court instructs the jury that, if they shall :find for 
the plaintiff, they will assess his damages in one sum aud 
in an amount sufficient to compensate him for the loss sus-
tained for the breach of the entire contract extending through-
out forty n1onths and covering all pay1nents that may become 
due and payable to the plaintiff during that time, and not 
merely for such payments as may have been past due by the 
terms of the said insurance policy when this suit was insti-
tuted, but not to exceed two thousand dollars, the amount 
sued for. 
page 87 ~ INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEFENDANT. 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. "A''. 
Refused as offered; amended and given as A-1. 
The Court instructs the jury that in order to recover in 
this case the plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of 
credible evidence, that on or before April 1, 1932, the date 
when the policy of insurance sued upon was cancelled, the 
plaintiff, as a result of bodily injury or disease, became per-
manently, continuously and wholly prevented from perforn1-
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ing any work for compensation or profit. And if the jury 
believe from· the evidence that since April 1, 1932, the date 
when the insurance aforesaid was cancelled, the plaintiff has 
engaged in any occupation or performed any work. for com-
pensation or profit, they must find for the defendant. 
page 88 ~DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. A-1. 
Given. Both sides except. 
The Court instructs the jury that in order to recover in 
this case, the plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of 
credible evidence, that on or before April 1, 1932, the date 
·when the policy of insurance. sued upon was cancelled, the 
plaintiff, as a result of bodily injury or disease, became per-
manently, continuously and wholly prevented from perform-
ing any work for compensation or profit. And if the jury 
believe from the evidence that since April 1, 1932, the date 
when the insurance aforesaid was cancelled, the plaintiff 
has been able reasonably to engage in any occupation or 
perform any work for compensation or profit, as set out in 
the instructions read and considered as a whole, they should 
"find for the defendant. 
page ·89 ~ (The Court at this time gave the additional 
oral instruction to the jury:) 
By the Court: As intimated in the last paragraph read 
you, you are to read all of these instructions together. Noth-
ing I l1a.ve said to you, or nothing contained in these instruc-
tions, is to be taken by you as intimating any opinion or view 
by the Court as to what facts you should find from the evi-
dence. That is wholly within your province, but when you 
find the facts from the evidence, these instructions read, as 
a whole, contain the law to guide you and you should find 
your verdict accordingly. 
page 90 }- After hearing the evidence, the instructions of 
the Court and arguments of counsel, the jury re-
tired to their room and later returned into Court with the 
following· verdict: ''We the jury find for the plaintiff and 
assess his damages at $397.25.'' 
The defendant, by counsel, thereupon moved the Court to 
set aside the verdict of the jury, as contrary to the law and 
the evidence, for the giving of improper instructions and 
refusal of and modification of instructions for the defend-
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ant, and because of errors of law, and moved the Court to 
enter up final judgment for the defendant. 
Which motion the Court overruled and defendant ex-
cepted. 
page 91 ~ I, Aubrey E. Strode, Judge of the Corporation 
Court of the City of Lynchburg, who presided 
over the foregoing trial of 'Vladyslave l{rupel vs. Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Company, do certify that the foregoing· 
is a true and correct stenographic copy or report of the 
evidence and all the evidence, and other incidents of the trial 
therein, including all the instructions given, amended or rC'-
fused, all exhibits or other writings introduced in evidence 
or presented .to the trial court, all questions raised and nll 
rulings thereon, which said case was tried in the Corp()ration 
Court for the· City of Lynchburg, Virginia, on the 19th day 
of January, 1934. As to the original exhibits introduced in 
evidence, it is agreed by the plaintiff and the defendant that 
the same, including the 1\Iaster Policy of Group Insurance 
issued to Lynchburg ~,oundry ·Company and of Certificates 
of Insurance given to plaintiff or exhibits thereof, may be 
transmitted to the Supreme Court of Appeals as part of the 
record in this cause, in lieu of certifying to said court copie;;; 
of said exhibits. 
And I do further certify that the attorneys for the plain-
tiff have had reasonable notice in writing, given by the de-
fendant, of the time and place when this report of the testi-
mony and other incidents of the trial will be tendered and 
presented to the undersigned for signature and authentica-
tion. 
Given under n1y hand this 14th day of April, 1934, within 
sixty days after the entry of the final judgment in said cause. 
A'UBRE·Y E. STRODE, 
Judge of the Corporation Court for tho 
City of Lynchburg, Virginia. 
page 92 ~ I, Ifubert H. Martin, Clerk of the Corporation 
Court for the city of Lynchburg, Virginia, do 
hereby certify that the foregoing stenographic copy or re-
port of testimony and other incidents in the trial of the case 
of Wladyslave l(rupel vs. The l\fetropolitan Life Insurance 
Company, was filed with me as clerk of said Court on the 
14th day of April, 1934. 
HUBERT H. ~IARTIN, Clerk. 
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·page 93 ~ I, Hubert H. ~{artin, clerk of the corporation 
court for the city of Lynchburg, hereby certify · 
that the foregoing is a true transcript of the record of the 
case of Wladyslave J{rupel, plaintiff, against Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Company, defendant, and I further certify 
that notices as required by Section 6253-f and Section 6339 
of the code were duly given as appears by paper writings 
filed with the record of said case. 
The clerk's fee for making this transcript is $7.50. 
Given under my hand this 18th day of April, 1934. 
HUBERT H. ~1:ARTIN, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste : 
~LB. "\VATTS, C. C. 
- - - - --------, 
INDEX 
Page. 
Petition for Writ of Error ........................ ; . . . 1 
Record .............................................. 21 
Notice of Motion for Judgment. . . . .................... 21 _ 
... L\..mended Notice of Motion for Judgment ............... 23 
Demurrer. . . . . ........................ ._ ............. 24 
Grounds of Defense. . . . . ............................. 25 
Judgment, lVIarch 5~ 1934. . . . .......................... 25 
l\£otion to Set Aside Verdict. . . . ....................... 26 
Evidence for Plaintiff. . . . .............................. 28 
1\·I. Grossman. . . . . . ~ .............................. 28 
W. Krupel ........................................ 29 
E. C. Wood. . . . . ................................. 33 
T. U. Gilbert. . . . . ................................ 36 
Dr. A. L. Wilson. . . . ......................... · .... 40 
Dr, E. F. Younger ................................ 44 
Dr. J ol1n Hundley ............................... ~.47 
T. T. Decker ...................................... 61 
Evidence for Defendant ............................... 50 
R. B. Caldwell. . . . . . .............................. 50 
Exhibit No. !-Statement of Claim for Disability ........ 31 
Stipulation-Cancellation of Policy .•................... 61 
Exceptions to Instructions. . . . . . ....................... 63 
Plaintiff's Instructions. . . . . . .............. · ........... 69 
Defendant's Instructions. . . . . .......................... 70 
Judge's Certificate .................................... 72 
Clerk's Certificate. . . . . .................... : .......... 72 
• 
